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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes a crucial period in the relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America, through the use of US government internal
documents. Willy Brandt brought forth a new vision of Ostpolitik that was starkly
different from policies that the US had dealt with before, subsequently leaving the Nixon
Administration largely unsure of how to react. The change in FRG economic positioning
vis-à-vis the United States, and catalyst political events in the 1960’s, created the impetus
for Brandt’s vision of OStpolitik, which culminated in the interim West German control of
the Western Alliance’s Eastern Politics.
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“We Germans must not forget our history. But we can also not continually utter
confessions of guilt…we must intensely, responsibly ask for our right to self
4

determination, to national self realization and with this make our contribution to the
healing [of the wounds] of Europe’s centre.”1-Willy Brandt
Chapter 1: Introduction
Question
Structural, diplomatic and economic changes took place after the end of World
War II, which fundamentally changed the dynamics within the Western Alliance.
Initially, the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the
United States of America was one wherein the US played the primary role and the FRG
played the secondary role; the United States led while the Federal Republic followed.
However, in the span of less than twenty-five years, between 1945 and 1969, the Federal
Republic of Germany changed from a war-torn country in economic and political ruin
that was dependent on US aid, into a leading power acting unilaterally to foster its own
foreign policy interests.
This thesis seeks to answer two questions surrounding this important period that
fundamentally altered the international geopolitical scene. The first question I will
address is: how did the post World War II relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America contribute to the development of Willy
Brandt’s vision of Ostpolitik? And, as a related question, how had the Federal Republic’s
economic position vis-à-vis the United States changed by 1969 when Brandt became
chancellor, as to allow him to pursue this vision of Ostpolitik? Through this analysis, I
aim to show that in response to political actions, (or inaction) by the United States, Willy
Brandt developed the impetus to purse a largely unilateral foreign policy for West
1 In January 1967, Brandt spoke in front the of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in
Strasburg, France where he attempted to magnify the point that “European nations and states were scarcely
capable of achieving a radical improvement of the East-West relationship if the United States and Soviet
Union did not also shift over to this course on a world political scale.” Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for
Europe, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969) 168.
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Germany, that had at its root the desire to integrate Eastward. Moreover, I will
demonstrate that because of the economic prowess of the Federal Republic, it no longer
was obliged to maintain its “follower” role with regard to the United States, thus allowing
Willy Brandt the leverage to pursue his foreign policy vision. Finally, in conclusion, I
will integrate these two themes and describe how the political will and economic
conditions supporting unilateral action led to the successes of Brandt’s New Ostpolitik,
and furthermore how, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, the
United States was forced into a position where it had to react to the initiatives of the
Federal Republic.
Through research conducted at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in
Yorba Linda, California, Documents from the US Department of State (FRUS) and
related research in the field, I have had the opportunity to investigate many important
internal White House and governmental documents. Through humor, frustration and
misgivings, these documents shed light on the true feelings of US White House Officials
throughout the development and implementation of Brandt’s policies. I have made it a
central point throughout this thesis to frequently highlight the true behind-the-scenes US
reactions to the policies of the Federal Republic under the Brandt Chancellery; these
meetings and anecdotes are especially interesting when US officials were publicly
proclaiming US support for Brandt’s Ostpolitik policies, while privately expressing
significant misgivings. In closing, I will assimilate these internal communications into
the main theme of this thesis, and comment on the way in which these perceptions,
conversations, policy choices, and decisions further exemplify the change of roles that
took place between the two nations regarding Eastern politics.
Background
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When Richard Nixon became president on 20 January 1969, the world was in
flux. The United States was in the midst of two conflicts—the Cold War and the conflict
in Vietnam—which were testing both the patience and resources of the US government
and citizens. President Nixon came to office with the ambitious goals of ending the
conflict in Vietnam, and starting the “Era of Negotiation” with Eastern Europe.
Only eight months after Mr. Nixon took office, Willy Brandt became the
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in October of 1969. A former
Atlanticist, Brandt believed the allegiance the Federal Republic had shown toward the US
since the end of World War II had not been reciprocated, and the Federal Republic of
Germany could no longer rely on the United States to advance the foreign policy interests
of the FRG as it had in the past. Meanwhile, post-World War II the FRG had reached a
new level of economic prosperity. These two factors, together, allowed the new
Chancellor to come into office with a plan for an aggressive form of détente, which was
more independent from the Western Alliance, and particularly, more independent from
the United States. Brandt’s policy was the new Ostpolitik, or East Politics, a “Wandel
durch Annäherung” or “change through rapprochement” policy that would allow West
Germany to pursue normalization of relations with the Eastern bloc. 2 Through this new
approach, Brandt began to embrace “a pan-European peace concept and anchored his
Westpolitik less and less with the United States and more and more with the European
Economic Community.”3 Brandt’s new Ostpolitik was motivated by three concerns: to

2

As Noel Cary discusses, “change through rapprochement” was the “dialectical watchword” of the West
Germans who thought that “negotiated accommodation” would provide the “political space needed for the
Communist system to reform itself”. Noel D. Cary, “Reassessing Germany’s Ostpolitik. Part 1: From
Détente to Refreeze”, Central European History 33, no. 2: (2000), doi: 10.1163/156916100746329
(accessed April 8, 2012).
3
Werner D. Lippert, The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma (New
York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 15.
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keep alive a feeling of national cohesion, “to atone for the sins of the past…behavior
toward Eastern Europe” and “to normalize relations with Eastern Europe in general.”4
By the time that Willy Brandt took office, talk of reunification between the two
German states had become scarce.5 To Brandt, reunification was the final goal, but not
the means to this end. He envisioned success in the long-term by basing the Federal
Republic’s Eastern policy on normalization tactics. The bettering of relations between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, Soviet Union,
and Soviet satellite states was the only plausible way he thought that there might ever be
a reunification of the two Germanys. Brandt believed that the division would “not vanish
from one day to the next and that as far as [could] be foreseen [would] be overcome only
in conjunction with a general improvement of East-West relations in Europe.”6
Previously important policy initiatives that expressed hostility toward the East Germans,
such as the Hallstein Doctrine, were no longer strategically beneficial, and their use
became obsolete.7 Due to West Germany’s economic position in Western Europe, the
Chancellor planned and was able to cultivate these eastern relations through the use of
trade deals and economic policies with the states in the Soviet bloc, beginning with the

4

Gebhard Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy; The Domestic Setting. (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1984), 49.
5 Dr. Walter Scheel, who became Vice-Chancellor of Germany under Brandt in October 1969, met with
President Nixon earlier that year, in June 1969, and said “It has now become clear to most people that the
kind of reunification aspired to ever since the end of World War II, with freely elected government, etc.,
stood no chance of being realized. Therefore, some preparatory, interim solution would have to be found.”
Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon and Walter Scheel, 13 June 1969; National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Library, Country Files, Europe Germany, Vol. I. through April 1969, Box
681.
6 Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe, 141.
7 The Hallstein Doctrine had been an influential part of West Germany foreign policy after 1955. It said
that if any third-party state were to recognize the German Democratic Republic in the international arena,
then the Federal Republic of Germany would sever diplomatic ties with that country. On June 4, 1969, the
FRG modified the Hallstein Doctrine so that GDR recognition would from then on be viewed as an
“unfriendly act” but not lead to immediate severing of diplomatic relations. German History in Documents
and Images “The New Ostpolitik and German-German Relations,” German History in Documents and
Images, accessed 1 April 2012, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=917.
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Soviet Union. During his tenure in office, Brandt exploited the only point of leverage
that he could with all of the parties involved: the Federal Republic’s economic position.
Meanwhile, the Nixon administration had a different plan for détente in Europe.
President Nixon’s policy was based around the premise of maintaining the status quo, and
avoiding an eruption into any sort of “large-scale conflict” between the United States and
the Soviet Union.8 Thus, the aggressive policy that the Brandt Chancellery brought to the
forefront alarmed the Nixon Administration. Fear grew that West Germany was,
perhaps, acting too independently, while disregarding the intentions of the United States
and other Western Allies. There was also concern that if this Ostpolitik was handled the
wrong way, the Federal Republic might succumb to the ideologies of the Eastern
European bloc, thus uprooting it from the Western Alliance. Henry Kissinger, President
Nixon’s Special Advisor for National Security Issues, thought there was a reason for
concern: “It seemed to me that Brandt’s new Ostpolitik, which looked to many like a
progressive policy of quest for détente, could in less scrupulous hands turn into a new
form of classic German nationalism.”9 President Nixon was believed to have an even
more negative stance on the Brandt policy.10 It is safe to say that the Nixon
administration viewed Ostpolitik with cautious suspicion.11
Since the end of World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany had kept its
foreign policy initiatives cohesive with the leadership and ideologies of the United States.
8

Fink Shaefer, Ostpolitik 1969-1974 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 81.
Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 409.
10
“Nixon was willing to strengthen the alliance as long as it did not interfere with his vision of détente.”
Clearly, the Brandt policy did interfere with Nixon’s version of détente. There are further examples of
conversations between Nixon and Kissinger in which Kissinger had the moderate view of the West German
détente policy. Lippert, The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma, 25.
11
According to Richard C. Thornton, in Nixon’s second year as President, the views of the two leaders
began to diverge especially. President Nixon wanted to maintain the bipolar order, while Kissinger thought
it was time to move to a multipolar order, in which the United States worked toward détente with the Soviet
Union. Richard C. Thornton; The Nixon Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy
(St.Paul: Paragon House Publishers, 2001), 151.
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This had been the case because “the relationship between the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany [was]…founded on the fact that West Germany owes its
existence to the United States.”12 The United States was a major force contributing to the
defeat of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich, helping to establish the Federal Republic of
Germany, giving it the resources and assistance to rebuild and to develop a bustling
economy, and providing American troops to safeguard the security and democracy of the
Federal Republic from the Communist Bloc. Through this support, West Germany had
become almost indebted to the United States, and in the decades after the war, German
politicians, including Willy Brandt, knew that it was important for the international
reputation and future prosperity of the Federal Republic of Germany to follow the foreign
policy lead of the United States.
However, by the late 1960’s, this idea of FRG dependence on the United States
began to change. Through several key political events of the1960’s, including the
building of the Berlin Wall and the pipeline embargo of 1963, the West Germans had
followed the lead of the United States, only to have their own foreign policy goals
neglected or tarnished for the proceeding years. Perceived mistreatment during these
events was the partial catalyst behind the formation of the independent viewpoints that
Willy Brandt held vis-à-vis the United States. Brandt was not alone in these changing
beliefs. Other members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), including Brandt’s closest
advisor, Egon Bahr, thought it was time that the Federal Republic act more unilaterally.13

12

Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy; The Domestic Setting, 1.
As early as 15 July 1963, Egon Bahr gave a speech discussing “Change through Rapprochement”, and
specifically mentioning Germany’s role in establishing stronger cooperation in economic affairs, and
overcoming “East-West Conflict” by dismantling the status quo. This was the first sign that the Social
Democratic Party, SPD, was building a new policy for dealing with the relations for West Germany’s
Eastern politics. German History in Documents and Images “Change through Rapprochement (July 15,
1963)”, German History in Documents and Images, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=81 (accessed 4 April 2012).
13
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Although many Germans found their relationship with the United States to be necessary,
there was also an underlying belief that the United States had benefitted more from the
alliance with the West Germans than the West Germans benefitted from their alliance
with the United States. All these factors, together, led many West Germans to eventually
support Willy Brandt’s policies.
In this thesis I aim to investigate how the Federal Republic of Germany’s position
vis-à-vis the United States changed as a result of Chancellor Willy Brandt's pursuit of
Ostpolitik. This is an interesting topic for several important reasons. The fundamental
relationship between West Germany and the United States was a complex one, in that the
Federal Republic virtually was in existence because of the United States. However, when
Willy Brandt became Chancellor of Germany, and aggressive policy changes were made
toward détente with Eastern Europe, it occurred against a backdrop of a vibrant German
economy, while the United States economy was not enjoying the same sort of positive
momentum. It felt a bit threatening to the Nixon administration, to say the least, that the
country that the United States had aided and “taken under its wing” since the end of the
Second World War, was now the most powerful country in the European Economic
Community (EEC), and was essentially changing the strategic direction of the Western
Alliance. The fiscal aid and security that the United States had provided to the Federal
Republic had facilitated West Germany's rise into the top three most economically
successful countries in the Western Alliance, amongst the ranks of Japan and the United
States.14
The political dynamics between the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany were in flux because the Federal Republic had become strong both

14

Thornton, The Nixon Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy, 9.
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economically and politically, such that dependence on the United States was no longer
the necessity that it had been in the past. This change fundamentally altered the
relationship between the two countries. This illustrates a broader concept of how the
relationship between a country that supplies aid and a country that receives aid can
change over time, and how those dynamics evolve when the dependent country that has
been receiving the aid develops into an economically powerful nation.
For reasons of economic prosperity and growth, as well as political motivations of
increased safety and security, it made sense that the Brandt government was interested in
building ties with some of the countries in Eastern Europe. However, it was the first time
that the Federal Republic had, in essence, undertaken a major foreign policy initiative
without the blessing of the United States government.
Moreover, the way in which the United States reacted to the Federal Republic’s
Ostpolitik was quite revealing. The United States, it seemed, was caught between a rock
and a hard place. Although the Nixon Administration did not fully support, by any
means, the policy of the Brandt government, the US did not want to risk showing a
Western “broken front” to the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc, thus possibly
admitting that the Federal Republic was not firmly grounded in the Western Alliance.
Furthermore, the worst possible outcome that the United States could fathom would have
been the Federal Republic becoming too close to the Communists, and actually losing its
grounding in the Western Alliance. The United States did not want, under any
circumstances, the FRG to become a part of the Soviet bloc. In this case, the United
States seemed uncertain of how to react to Bonn’s new policies, because suddenly, the
US was no longer in the usual position of leading the foreign policy initiatives of West
Germany.

12

Previous Research
Many scholars have previously investigated the relationship between the United
States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic
Republic on the road to Ostpolitik. In The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik, Werner
Lippert argues that Willy Brandt used energy trade with the Soviet Union in order to
pursue détente, while US-FRG disagreement on which form of détente to pursue
ultimately led to the inability of the Western Alliance to formulate unified policies vis-àvis the Soviet Union in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. He argues that this ultimately
led to “NATO’s energy dilemma” which still exists today.15 In Angela Stent’s From
Embargo to Ostpolitik: Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980,
Stent looks at the different political actors that influenced the economic relationship
between the Soviet Union and FRG and how economic factors helped shape the political
relationship between the two.16
This thesis will add to the current research on the topic. By investigating US
government internal documents, I will present the history of the relationship between the
United States and Federal Republic of Germany during this time. I will analyze how and
why the views of Chancellor Brandt developed over time, and why his viewpoints were
arguably appropriate when he took office in 1969. Furthermore, through an economic
analysis, I will demonstrate how the powerful economic position of the Federal Republic
vis-à-vis the United States and the rest of the Western Alliance, as well as the Soviet
Union, German Democratic Republic, and the rest of the Communist Bloc, allowed the
Federal Republic to leverage this economic strength and pursue this détente policy.

15

Lippert, The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma.
Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 19551980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
16

13

Eventually, I will come to the conclusion that economics was the basis and the
foundation of the Eastern policy moves, and one of the major reasons that the Federal
Republic had the ability to pursue its policy while remaining an influential member of the
Western Alliance. I will argue that Brandt’s policy for Ostpolitik was developed largely
in reaction to perceived US neglect, but that the FRG had the ability to pursue this new
policy direction largely because of its economic prowess. Finally, because of the Federal
Republic’s important leading European position, I will show how the United States was
essentially forced into accepting the secondary foreign policy role, while the Federal
Republic took the lead in pursuing this independent strategic initiative.
Moving Forward
This thesis will proceed by looking at the economic and political history leading
up to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, and the United States reactions to these economic and
political changes in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the Second Chapter, I will
present the economic policies that were implemented amongst the Western Allies after
the end of World War II and how the Federal Republic was able to benefit from these
policies in order to ascent to its international economic position. Here, I will analyze the
reasons why the Federal Republic was able to improve its economic position vis-à-vis the
United States and the states in Communist bloc. Aside from a structural analysis, I will
also incorporate a short data analysis of important economic metrics for the US and the
FRG during the late 60’s and early 70’s. In Chapter Three, I will proceed by detailing the
political history of Ostpolitik leading up to 1969 when Willy Brandt took office. I will
investigate the significant geopolitical events that took place in the late 1950’s and
1960’s, and the United States reactions to changing diplomatic relations that influenced
Brandt’s new policy. This analysis will begin under FRG Chancellor Adenauer in 1958,

14

and progress up until 1969 when Brandt won the Chancellery and the Grand Coalition
was subsequently dissolved. Then, in Chapter Four, I will study the implementation of
Brandt’s policy of Ostpolitik. Within this analysis, I will present the United States
internal reactions to these new initiatives. Finally, in Chapter Five I summarily argue that
with the combination of increased economic power and the evolving independent
unilateral foreign policy direction of the Federal Republic, the United States became the
secondary actor, while the Federal Republic, for the first time since World War II, took
the role of the primary actor in Western diplomacy towards the Eastern Bloc.

Chapter II: Economic Background
There are several key reasons why the Federal Republic gained the strong
economic position it held in 1969, which it was then able to use in order to pursue
its policies of Ostpolitik. Had the Federal Republic not successfully rebuilt its
ruined economy following the end of the Second World War, none of the new
Eastern policies it pursued would have even been feasible, because the FRG
would not have had any economic leverage over the Eastern European states, and
thus no way to link politics with economics the way in which it did. In this
section, I will outline the reasons that the economy of the Federal Republic was
able to gain it’s positioning so quickly in the aftermath of World War II, enabling
it to perform what has been termed the Wirtschaftswunder or “the economic

15

miracle”, and putting the country in a position allowing it to pursue Ostpolitik
when Willy Brandt became Chancellor.
The Marshall Plan
The Marshall Plan was fundamental in the rebuilding of the European
states after World War II. As it was originally envisioned, the Marshall Plan
would include all of the previously war torn Europe.17 At the April 1947 Council
of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow, George C. Marshall called upon Allies
as well as the USSR and Soviet satellite states to support a plan for aid to Europe
with special emphasis on the reconstruction of the German Industrial sector. The
Truman Administration knew that the German economy was one of the most
important factors in the recovery of all of Europe, so economic aid for the
German economy was an integral part of the plan.18 Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov expressed the views of General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin and the USSR when he said that the
Soviet Union would be unwilling to support a plan that helped a nation [West
Germany] that had so recently brought devastation to the Soviet Union.19 Still
trying to garner Soviet support, Secretary of State Marshall had a separate
conversation with Stalin, trying to convince him of the value of the plan, in which
17

As William L. Clayton, the US representative in talks with European Ministers for Foreign Affairs said
in his article, in 1947, “the road was open for Russia and her satellite countries to be included in the
Marshall Plan.” William L. Clayton, “GATT, The Marshall Plan, and OECD” Political Science Quarterly,
78, no. 4 (1963), 500; http://www.jstor.org/stable/2146352, (accessed 29 March 2012).
18 According to Eichengree and Uzan, if the German economy was “held down” it would affect the amount
that the country would be able to import, which would in turn affect the economic health of all of Europe.
Harry Eichengreen and Marc Uzan, “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern
Europe and the Former USSR,” Economic Policy, 7, no. 2 (1992): 21,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1344512 (accessed 20 March 2012).
19 Later, in the Paris Conference of June 1947, Minister Molotov walked out of talks on the Marshall Plan
after 2 days. Czechoslovakia and Poland had already cabled to Washington that they wished to be included
amongst the Marshall Plan Recipients, but the USSR made them withdraw this agreement. Clayton,
“GATT, The Marshall Plan, and OECD,” 501.
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he told the Russian leader that the US “hoped to aid those countries that are
suffering from economic deterioration which, if unchecked, might lead to
economic collapse and the consequent elimination of any chance of democratic
survival”.20 However, Stalin would not acquiesce. Instead, the Soviet leader
believed that agreeing to the plan would mean giving up reparations that the
tripartite occupying countries (US, UK and USSR) had agreed to at the Potsdam
Conference in 1945; Stalin said the “Soviet Union could not” do this.21 Marshall
was unable to garner support from the USSR, so instead moved on without the
Soviets.
In a Commencement speech at Harvard University in June 1947, George
C. Marshall called for a plan to rebuild Europe, thus announcing the US policy
plans to the world.22 Shortly thereafter, in early 1948, Congress passed the
Economic Cooperation Act, approving funding for the rebuilding of Europe.
Secretary Marshall saw the plan as necessary, directed not “against any country or
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should
be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the existence of

20

Stalin did not believe that the collapse of the European economy was imminent as the United States led
on. Memorandum of Conversation, 15 April 1947, FR: 1947, 2:340-41 cited in Scott D. Parriah, and
Mikhail M. Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports”,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
http://cursos.iteso.mx/moodle/pluginfile.php/64113/mod_resource/content/0/Marshall_Plan.pd f (accessed
20 March 2012).
21 The Potsdam Agreement was focused on the 4 D’s: “demilitarization, denazification, democratization,
decentralization, and deindustrialization”. In terms of reparations, each of the four Allied powers was to
seize reparations from its own occupation zones, but the Soviet Union was allowed “10–15 percent of the
industrial equipment in the western zones of Germany in exchange for agricultural and other natural
products from its zone.” Encyclopedia Britannica, “Potsdam Conference” Encyclopedia Britannica
Academic Edition, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/472799/Potsdam-Conference (accessed 10
March 2012).
22 Foreign Relations of the United States, Milestones, 1945-1952; Marshall Plan, 1948.
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political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”23 Marshall and
the United States knew that the remnants of the war were still affecting the
countries of Europe, as agriculture and food production had been disrupted,
pushing some countries to the brink of famine.24
The plan became officially known as the European Recovery Program
(ERP), and was based around rebuilding the economies of Western Europe.
Under the Marshall Plan, European countries were to join in intra-European trade,
and to help fulfill this objective, the countries formed the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).25 The US Department of State had
insisted on two points in the formation of the Marshall Plan: that the recipients of
the Marshall Plan organize themselves into “a committee of cooperation” that
should remain even if the Marshall Plan aid had ended, and that this committee
should work out “the measure and mechanics” of the aid and present it to the
United States. This committee was formally named the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation in the spring of 1948.26 Under the OEEC the
countries established the European Payments (EPU) to deal with the differences
in currency between the European states. The goal of the EPU was to build up the

23

Foreign Relations of the United States, A Short History of the Department of State.
George C. Marshall Foundation, “The Marshall Plan,” George C. Marshall Foundation,
http://www.marshallfoundation.org/TheMarshallPlan.htm (accessed 12 March 2012).
25 The OEEC included every country West of the Iron Curtain except for Finland and Yugoslavia. When
the ERP was terminated in 1951, the OEEC continued to exist. Andreas Grotewold, “West Germany's
Economic Growth,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 63, no. 3 (1973): 355, accessed 5
April 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2562001.
26 By 1963, the name had changed to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), and the United States and Canada had both become members. Clayton, “GATT, The Marshall
Plan, and OECD”, 493-503.
24
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largest European trading partners to the point where they had accumulated
adequate levels of US dollars and gold reserves.27
The European Recovery Program turned out to be more than successful, as
13 billion dollars were invested in Europe between 1948 and 1951.28 This gave
the European governments both economic and political space to maneuver. As J.
Bradford De Long, and Barry Eichengreen argue, the Marshall Plan brought with
it a structural change, which was crucial to the growth of the system.29 Moreover,
West Germany saw the most economic growth during these years out of all the
Marshall Plan recipients. At the end of World War II, the level of Industrial
production in West Germany had fallen to less than 20% of what it had been prior
to the war. This was worse than Belgium, France, and the Netherlands who were
still producing at 30% of their prewar levels.30 According to some scholars, this
was due not to the destruction of German facilities, but instead to the problem of
obtaining raw materials, transportation, and food distribution.31 In just four years,
the Federal Republic had increased its level of production by 312%, and by 1951,
West Germany was performing higher than pre-World War II levels (1938).32

27

The EPU met this goal in 1959, and was abolished.
The Marshall Plan has become known as one of the greatest economy recovery and foreign policy plans
in decades.
29
De Long and Eichengreen argue that without this structural shift, political economy in Europe may have
followed in the footsteps of post-World War II Argentina, where economic stagnation and overregulation
were rampant. J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen, “NBER Working Papers Series: The Marshall
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The Bretton Woods System
A second program that brought economic support for the West Germans
was the creationn of the Bretton Woods system. Just 10 years after
fter the currency
and price control reform of 1948
1948,, “the German ‘economic miracle’ rapidly made
the Federal Republic the most important economic power in Western Europe and,
indeed, one of the great industrial powers in the world33. How did this
reformation happen so quickly?
In July 1944, representatives from the 44 Allied nations met in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire in order to discuss aand
nd subsequently sign, the Bretton
Woods Agreement. The Allied nations had learned from the economic
33
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misfortunes they experienced in the period between World War I and World War
II, and wanted to ensure that conditions were set up in order to prevent similar
outcomes from reoccurring. These precarious conditions were due largely to
government fiscal reactions to the Great Depression in the 1930’s had made the
international economic environment unstable, and a similar fate was to be
avoided.34
The British and the Americans both offered similar, but slightly different
ideas on how to pursue a policy that would assist countries that had short-term
balance of payments deficits, so that the Allied countries would develop liberal
policies instead of protectionist trade and monetary policies. Harry Dexter White
from the United States, and John Maynard Keynes from the United Kingdom both
presented possible plans to combat the same problem. Both economists wanted to
overcome the past issues in the world monetary system, and foster conditions for
the successful international regrowth of capitalism. The different plans were
debated for almost two years, until a “Joint Statement by Experts on the
Establishment of an International Monetary Fund” was released in April 1944.35
This led to the development of the Bretton Woods System, which
subsequently led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Under
Bretton Woods, all currencies were pegged to the US dollar, and exchange rates
were altered through international agreements with the Americans. The dollar
was linked to gold, by the guarantee from the United States that the government
34

During the Great Depression, the US tried to counteract their economic misfortunes by raising tariffs,
competitively devaluing its currency, and creating discriminatory trading blocs. Foreign Relations of the
United States; Milestones: 1937-1945, The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944.
35 Foreign Relations of the United States; Milestones: 1937-1945, The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944.

21

would purchase dollars throughout the world at a fixed price of $35 dollars per
ounce of gold. The IMF was developed to assist in “stabilizing exchanges” around
the US dollar and gold reserves. A central pool of reserves was created to
administer temporary loans to countries that were in a balance of payments
deficit. Each country would contribute to this central pool, but the largest
contributions came from the United States.36 The IBRD was in charge of
extending credits for development and reconstruction to the countries that had
been destroyed by the war. The idea was that these institutions would help to
quickly restore trade, while stabilizing currencies, reducing exchange
discrimination and restrictions, and avoiding competitive devaluation between
countries.37 In his closing remarks at the Bretton Woods conference, US
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau reiterated the objectives of the
Bretton Woods System when he said, “This is a curious notion that the protection
of national interest and development of international cooperation are conflicting
philosophies…none of us has found incompatibility between devotion to our
country and joint action.”38 Morgenthau was thus calling for the end of economic
nationalism.
The Bretton Woods System provided huge economic advantages for the
Federal Republic. The German economy soon became characterized by rapid
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annual growth of the gross national product (GNP) and an almost steady
succession of balance-of-payments surpluses.”39 Between the years of 1950 and
1958, the West German share in Gross National Product doubled, while exports
from the Federal Republic rose by over 20%.40
Problems with Bretton Woods
By pegging their currencies to gold, this fixed individual nation’s price
levels to that of the world.41 The fixed exchange rate was advantageous, because
it protected against foreign shocks. However, the system did not always work as
planned, as the competitive nature of the individuals and countries remained.
Countries who were in balance-of-payment surplus were reluctant to appreciate
their currencies, while countries in deficit were quick to depreciate in order to
increase their edge competitively. In a December 1952 note on the “Economic
Assumptions Underlying American Economic Foreign Policy”, US Department of
State Official John M. Leddy wrote:
Under the gold standard the notion was that an inflow of payments
produced by an export surplus would tend automatically to increase prices
in the surplus country and reduce prices in the deficit country, thus
stimulation imports into the surplus country and deterring imports into the
deficit country. Whatever may have been the validity of their notion in the
past it is clear that under present and foreseeable circumstances there is no
direct or automatic connection between the inflow and outflow of
payments and internal price levels.42

39

Background Notes: Federal Republic of Germany; United States Department of State Publication 7834;
July 1967; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Europe Germany,
Vol. I. through April 1969, Box 681.
40 Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century: The German Reich and the
Federal Republic, (London: Routledge, 1990), 170.
41 Michael D. Bordo, A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary
Reform (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 5.
42 Paper Prepared for the Working Group on American Economic Policy; Note on Economic Assumptions
Underlying American Economic Foreign Policy by John M. Leddy, 11 December 1952, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume I, Part 1, General: Economic and Political Matters (in two parts),
Document 16.

23

Under Bretton Woods, nations that had either a balance of payments
surplus or deficit were asked to change the value of their currency in order to
restore the balance of payments back to equilibrium. Thus, nations that had a
balance of payments surplus were called upon to appreciate their currencies, and
countries that had a balance of payments deficit were expected to depreciate their
currencies. Devaluation meant decreasing the value of one nation’s currency
relative to gold or the currency of other nations, in order to create equilibrium in
the balance of payments. If one country was losing money in its trade with
another country, a decision may be made to revalue the winning country’s
currency. For example, in a memorandum from the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors to President Nixon in May 1969, the President was informed
that in that week “$1 billion (net) flowed into Germany, and…the British lost
some $200 million.” He went on to say that it “would be nice” if the Germans
decided to “revalue the mark unilaterally, but there are no indications they will do
so.”43 In this situation, if the West Germans were to revalue the mark, this would
make British products less expensive for the Germans, and German products more
expensive for the British. The hope would be that this currency revaluation would
lead to the increase of imports from Britain to the Federal Republic, and the
decrease in exports from the Federal Republic to Britain.
Economic Integration and Consequences for Bretton Woods
Following World War II, the Federal Republic made it a point to embed
itself within many international organizations in order to better facilitate its liberal

43 Memorandum for the President from The Chairman of the Council of Economic Adviser on The
International Monetary Situation, 5 May 1969; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,
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trade policy and general relations, and thus the FRG became an integral part of
many treaties and partnerships. A liberal trade policy is one in which a country
reduces its tariffs and other trade barriers, in order to facilitate international trade.
The United States was very involved in pressuring the Germans to work toward
European integration. On 30 October 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) was signed.44 In 1951, the FRG was one of the founding
members of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was the first
organization that was formed based on supranationalism, and in 1955, the Federal
Republic joined NATO. On 25 March 1957, the European Economic Community
(EEC) went into effect. Over the following twelve years, a Common Market was
to be formed between West Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).45 The United States had expressed
its strong support for the coming together of European states. Former US
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conveyed this sentiment to former
Chancellor Erhard when he said that the Americans believed that previous wars
were caused because of the “division of Europe”, and that the “Europeans have an
obligation to tie themselves together and to attain strength in that way so that it
will not be necessary to call upon the US again.”46 As the most economically
powerful nation in the EEC, the US believed that the FRG should have been the
main actor prompting these moves toward integration.47

44

By 1963, in 15 years, GATT had increased international trade to about $125 billion annually, and 50
nations were a part of GATT. Clayton, “GATT, The Marshall Plan, and OECD”, 503.
45 Peter H. Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West & East, (Santa Barbara: Clio Press Inc., 1974), 102.
46
Memorandum of Conversation between the Department of State and FRG minister Erhard, 7 June 1955;
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957; Volume IV, Western European Security and
Integration, Document 97.
47 Dulles went on to say that the reason that Adenauer was so well liked in the United States is because the
“US thinks of him as a European”. Memorandum of Conversation between the Department of State and

25

This integration created more opportunities for the economy of the Federal
Republic. Through its liberal trade policy, the FRG opened its domestic market to
foreign suppliers, a competition policy that was based on market economy lines.48
This policy led to the rapid economic expansion of the Federal Republic and
moreover, the West Germans saw the importance of bridging these connections,
because they saw trade as “the alpha and omega” of their future.49 However, it
also meant that the Federal Republic’s economy was highly integrated with the
international market, and success of the West German economy was contingent
upon the development of West German structure in accordance with international
demand.
Through the FRG’s liberal trade policy, the Deutschemark became
increasingly undervalued, which made exports rise drastically, increasing 10.5%
annually after 1958.50 German trade surpluses existed over a number of years in a
“sizeable amount”.51 For that reason, in the late 1960’s, the United States and
other countries in the EEC attempted to convince West Germany to revalue the
mark, since there was a “fundamental German payments imbalance”. In 1968, the
US Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler, argued that, “Germany is a strong
country and is attracting large amounts of money.” He went on to say that US
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had been in the role of the “strong country” for many years, and Germany is now
also in that position with the US, thus indicating that it would be appropriate for
the West Germans to revalue the Mark.52
However, as mentioned earlier, there were problems with the Bretton
Woods System, in that countries were hesitant to revalue or devalue their
currency in certain situations. For example, in this case, the West Germans
enjoyed the competitive trade advantage that the undervalued Deutschmark gave
them. In meetings in Bonn between November 22 and November 24, 1968, the
US, French and British economic leaders strongly urged the Germans to revalue
the Deutschemark by 7.5% in order to compensate for the “structural imbalance”
caused by the undervalued Deutschemark. US Secretary Fowler continually
called the “parity change” the standard procedure to compensate for such an
imbalance. However, West German Economics Minister Schiller, and Federal
Minister of Finance Strauss, did not believe that the use of a single parity change
would fix the structural imbalance of countries in trade deficits. Schiller and
Straus ultimately decided that the Federal Republic had “no intention” of
changing its parity, displeasing the other countries present.53 Instead, West
Germany decided to take other initiatives that they believed would increase
imports and reduce exports. The FRG reduced the border tax by 4% on exports
and imports and also called for “an international credit arrangement of a special
quality”, and “additional balance of payments measures by deficit countries” in

52Here,
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order to ensure the credibility of the package.54 This was the West Germans way
of encouraging imports and discouraging exports, but a revaluation did not take
place as the US Secretary of the Treasury had so strongly suggested.55
Germany Revalues the Mark
Finally, in 1969 under the Grand Coalition, the continuing strength of the
Mark against the US dollar, as well as the international pressure that the West
Germans felt, pushed them to float the Mark in September of 1969. Furthermore,
this was also a strategic move for the West Germans, undertaken in order to halt
domestic inflation that had been on the rise. When Brandt took office, he chose to
revalue the Deutschemark on 24 October 1969 to a parity that was 9.28% higher
than the previous parity.56 However, the revaluation by the Germans was
insufficient to completely rectify the disparity between Germany and the United
States.57
US Looks Toward Restructuring Bretton Woods
In the wake of continuing problems, in the late 60’s and early 70’s, US
policymakers contemplated how they should respond to the ongoing crises within
the international monetary system and looked toward restructuring the system.58
When Nixon came to power, the US economy had begun to falter, even if
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marginally. Although not admittedly so, Nixon may have felt that the hegemonic
power of the United States was in danger of decreasing to a level of
insignificance. Amongst the discussions of a National Security Council meeting
in 1970, the NSC looked at the long-term prospects of the EEC which seemed to
be chillingly prosperous for the European Economic Community: “This bloc will
account for about half of world trade, compared with our 15%; it will hold
monetary reserves approaching twice our own; and it will even be able to outvote
us constantly in the international economic organizations.”59 Evidently, the
consequences that might arise in the future from a loss of United States economic
hegemony, and what this change could mean for the future of the Western
Alliance weighed heavily on the minds of United States officials.
At this juncture, it seemed that the United States should strategically
devalue the dollar in order to keep equilibrium at the center of the system.
However, the Nixon Administration’s idea to devalue was not met with agreement
from the Western allies. Allies that were in surplus did not want the United States
to devalue, and threatened to devalue by the same amount should the United
States decide to go ahead with devaluation.60 Thus, the basic tenants of the
Bretton Woods System were being threatened by the fact that countries were
reluctant to weaken their competitive trade advantages by complying with one of
the fundamental principles of the agreement.
Furthermore, since the United States had the central role in this monetary
system, there was an inflationary bias within the system, which led to a higher
optimal level of inflation. In 1969, when Nixon became President, the annual
59
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inflation rate calculated by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics was
5.46%, increasing especially in the latter part of the decade from only 1.46% in
1960. By 1970, it had risen even higher, to 5.84%.61 The dollar became
significantly overvalued abroad, and since the American economy held the
liquidity for the system, the United States maintained a persistent balance of
payments deficit.62 In a paper prepared about the United States economic
situation, “The United States Position in the World: An Overview”, ““The U.S.
balance of payments deficit,” was said to be “aa persistent problem for the United
States that will continue for at least se
several years into the future.”63
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At the end of the decade, there was a shift in economic strength. Where
the United States had consistently been the hegemonic power both politically and
economically within the Western Alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany
began to see an increase in its power vis-à-vis the United States. Part of this was
a result of the American involvement in the Vietnam War, and the loss of
resources as a result. Meanwhile, in Europe, the Federal Republic had essentially
become the most important member of the EEC and thus the most important
member of Western Europe.64
FRG Success in Pursuing Ostpolitik Unilaterally: A Quantitative Analysis
When the Nixon Administration took office, the United States was starting to
stagnate economically in comparison to the exponential growth of the Federal Republic.
In the fall of 1969, US economic expansion ceased.65 Aside from a short recession in the
late 1960’s, West Germany’s economy had grown dramatically. This change in the
dynamics between the two economies of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United States of America influenced the ability of the Federal Republic to initiate
Brandt’s unilateral moves toward Eastern détente, via this evolving economic leverage.
As events unfolded in the 1960’s, it became clearly evident to Willy Brandt that the
Federal Republic needed to “accept that it was an economic giant and stop behaving like
a political dwarf”. Since West Germany had previously vested the majority of it’s
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foreign policyy goals and initiatives in the US, the Federal Republic used its recent growth
in economic power in order to increase its political power.66
The impetus for the economic growth of the Federal Republic was in large part
enabled by the post-war
war aid from the United States. However, other policy decisions,
such as the choice to engage in liberal trade
trade, also contributed to the development of the
robust and growing German economy. The growth of the Federal Republic was
phenomenal: in 1959, West German GNP was 60 billion dollars; 122.7 billion dollars in
1966, 135.3 billion in 1968, and by 1970 it had grown to 188 billion dollars..
West German Gross National Product
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Between 1959 and 1970, in less than one dozen years, the West German GNP had more
than tripled.67 The growth in GNP per capita was also impressive. Between 1950, and
1965, the average growth rate per capita Gross National Product (GNP) was the highest
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among Western European nations at 6.3% annually.68 The Federal Republic also showed
significant improvements in other important econo
economic metrics:
Trade
By 1961, the Federal Republic of Germany had become the Western European
country with the largest volume of world trade. West Germany was second in the world
only to the United States, with trade valued at over 23 billion dollars.. Impressively,
Impressivel by
1965, the share of FRG foreign trade was 10.4% of total world trade.69
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Moreover, by 1967, the Federal Republic of Germany had a yearly positive
balance of trade larger than that of the United States, which increased the Federal
Republic’s net currency asset position. This was also quite a change from the previous
two decades. Until
ntil 1966, the West German trade surpluses were rarely more than oneone
third those of the United States. 70 The balance of trade between the West Germans
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the United States had changed drastically. In 1967, the US had imported $1, 955 million
of FRG goods and exported $1, 706 million to West Germany. However
However,, in 1968,
America imported $2,721
721 million worth of goods, and only exported $1, 792 million
millio
worth, which created a $1,000 million balance of trade deficit for the United States.71
Through the inflationary bias in the system, the dollar had become significantly
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overvalues abroad, to the detriment of US trade.
72

United States Balance of Payments
Payments// The Results of the International Monetary
System
In addition to ongoing economic effects from the Bretton Woods System, the
t
United States further experienced domestic economic pressure from the Vietnam War,
which caused a deficit in its balance of payments in the public sectors due to military
costs and expenditures abroad. The overall deficit was significant by the 1960’s. In
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1964, the public sector deficit was 2.9 billion dollars, 4.2 billion dollars in 1967, and rose
to 6.9 billion dollars in 1969.73 However, by 1970, the deficit reached a new high of
almost 10 billion dollars, which contributed to moving the United States economy into
recession.
The Bretton Woods System was having deleterious consequences on the
economy of the United States. The central banks of other countries, in order to limit the
appreciation of their own currency, began stockpiling American dollars, in effect
resulting in currency manipulation. The Federal Republic of Germany held one of the
largest dollar reserves. The desire of member countries to gain a competitive trade
advantage worked against the ideals of the Bretton Woods System. At the turn of the
new decade, when the American deficit reached a new record high, the West German
dollar reserves also reached a new high at nearly 6 billion US dollars.74 The Bretton
Woods constraints, although beneficial for the growth of developing economies abroad,
were beginning to wear heavily on the United States. This further contributed to an
changing balance of economic power between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United States, altogether serving to facilitate Brandt’s efforts in a new foreign policy
direction.
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Chapter III. Political Background
The Beginning of Ostpolitik: Adenauer Urged to Negotiate
The beginning of Ostpolitik, or Eastern politics, took place in the late 1950’s. A
leader in the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), West German Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer was regarded as a “dream partner” to the United States; he became known for
cooperating closely with the US and for his role in integrating West Germany with the
Western alliance.75 He was the first Chancellor of Germany to be elected by the
Bundestag in 1949, eventually serving for 14 years. Under the urging of United States
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Adenauer looked toward developing closer ties
with the Soviet Union. He worked with the West German Economics Minister, Ludwig
Erhard, in efforts to negotiate East-West trade. However, Adenauer based much of his
trade policy around the requirement that the Soviet Union succumb to West German
wishes by making political concessions in exchange for economic benefits, which
ultimately proved largely unsuccessful. He thought the Soviets, and subsequently, the
East Germans, might surrender some of their political positions in the interest of trade
and for the betterment of their own economy. The West Germans did achieve limited
success in that they were able to pass the Long-Term Agreement on Trade and Payments,
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and the Agreement on General Questions of Trade and Navigation on April 25, 1958. 76
These treaties have been said to be the first actions toward West German Ostpolitik.77
However, these trade deals were not signed on the pretenses that the Germans had
envisioned. The FRG had to make the majority of political concessions in these
agreements, while the Soviets conceded little, if anything. Even so, the basis for these
agreements, and the foundation of Ostpolitik was purely economic.78
During this same period, the United States began pushing the West Germans to
take on a larger role within Europe by pursuing European integration, and by taking on a
larger role in the further development of the weaker European countries. In a meeting on
11 December 1959, the US Under Secretary, Dillon, said: “The United States considered
the Federal Republic as one of the principal countries obliged to increase its financial
assistance to the developing countries.”79 The economy of the Federal Republic was
continuing to grow considerably, and the United States asked more of the FRG within the
Western Alliance. It should have been quite expected, then, as the Federal Republic
contributed more financial resources to the Alliance, that they would expect to have a
larger policy influence amongst the Allies. With growing economic strength, the political
strength of the FRG also began to expand.
Brandt Grounded in the West
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Brandt served as Mayor of West Berlin from 1957 until 1966. In his early years
as a politician, his ideas were quite different from those that could be found in his New
Ostpolitik. Although Brandt was part of the Social Democratic Party, early on, he shared
many of the foreign policy ideas of the Christian Democratic Party, and Chancellor
Adenauer, the “dream partner” of the United States. As mayor, Willy Brandt was
beginning to emerge as the clear right wing leader of the SPD who was pro-American,
anti-Communist, and an advocate of the status quo in Central Europe, similar to the likes
of Chancellor Adenauer.80 In the early 1960’s, Brandt himself was openly against many
of the policies that he would later advocate in his Ostpolitik while he openly proclaimed
his ideologies were strongly grounded in Alliances with the United States and NATO.81
Indicative of his subsequent change in stance, in the early 60’s Brandt saw giving into the
idea of the two separate Germanys as giving into the problem instead of solving it.
The Berlin Crisis
The Berlin crisis and subsequent events marked a key turning point in the
evolution of Brandt’s attitude toward the United States. On 4 June 1961, USSR
Chairman Nikita Khrushchev made a serious threat to President Kennedy regarding
82

Berlin.

Khrushchev warned that by the end December 1961, the Western powers must

withdraw their troops from Berlin, or the Soviets would sign a separate peace treaty with
the German Democratic Republic, which would end the rights involved in the four power
agreements. Ending these rights would mean that the Americans, British and French
80
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would no longer have access to West Berlin.83 Khrushchev threatened President Kennedy
multiple times that if, once signed, the peace treaty were to be violated by the United
States, then the Soviets would defend the East Germans.84 It was evident that Khrushchev
and the Soviets had come to fear the scenario of a unified Germany allied with the West.85
Kennedy did not give in to the Russian leader, but continually attempted to “reiterate his
hopes that the relations between the two countries would develop in such a way to avoid
confrontation.”86
The seemingly rash judgment by the Soviets did not come without warrant,
however. The Soviet Satellite was losing many of its East German citizens to West
Germany. East Germany was lagging far behind its Western counterpart in terms of
economic development, and there were many jobs to be had in West Germany. Between
1950 and 1960, there was on average greater than 200,000 immigrants from the East to
the West annually. In 1961 alone, according to West German records, 207,026 East
Germans crossed the border.87
83
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The Berlin Wall, Brandt Feels Neglected
The Soviets evidently did not feel reassured after the meeting with President
Kennedy, and had become impatient over the number of East German citizens relocating
to West Germany. Early on the morning of 13 August 1961, the German Democratic
Republic “introduced control measures that effectively prevented residents of the Soviet
Zone and East Berlin from entering West Berlin. At the same time, barbed wire and other
physical barriers that eventually became ‘The Berlin Wall’ were erected to restrict
crossings into the Western sectors of the city.”88 Mayor Willy Brandt especially struggled
with the building of the Berlin Wall. What perturbed him most about the events of
August 1961 was the lack of support he felt from US President Kennedy and the United
States. From the outset, the United States was slow to respond to the Soviet action. The
first US military patrols did not arrive until 20 hours after the construction site had been
initially created. Brandt was infuriated, and even went so far as to call the United States
leaders “shitheads”89. He felt that the United States should have responded much sooner,
and in not doing so, the US leaders had neglected one of their closest allies in the
Berliners.
A “crisis of confidence” took place, wherein Brandt and his supporters in the
FRG were uncertain about what role in their partnership the United States was actually
willing to play. This unrest did not go unnoticed by American diplomats. Three days
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after construction of the wall began, Allan Lightner, the head of the US Mission to
Berlin, sent a message to the US Department of State, warning Washington that inaction
by the United States may lead to severe repercussions in relations with the FRG down the
road.90
Even so, Washington did not feel the compulsion to take any sort of serious
action, but instead decided to take smaller, “symbolic” measures. John F. Kennedy was
unwilling to condone any course of action that he thought might lead to war.91 The
United States’ seemingly slow reaction to the events in Berlin was most likely due to the
irritation that the Kennedy administration felt at that time in regard to the West Germans.
From internal White House documents, it is evident that the Kennedy administration
thought the Berliners were too frequently asking for reassurance from their Western
Allies. 92
What was clear was that this situation left a bad taste in the mouth of Mayor
Brandt. Three days after the Wall went up, Brandt sent Kennedy a letter “between
friends” naming the psychological effects the situation might have on the citizens of the
Federal Republic, and asking President Kennedy to bring the Berlin question before the
90
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United Nations on the basis that “the USSR has violated the Declaration of Human
Rights in the most flagrant manner.”93 Brandt must have been agitated, to say the least,
when Kennedy replied to Brandt’s letter two days later saying that there was not much
the United States would be able to do to better the situation at the current juncture,
refusing Brandt’s request to go in front of the United Nations. The one concession the
President did make was the reinforcement of US troops in the Western garrison. In
essence, President Kennedy was unwilling to threaten the status quo, and risk the advent
of war with the Soviet Union as long as he felt that the West Germans were not in grave
danger.94
The damage to the morale of the Federal Republic of Germany, and that of Mayor
Brandt, was not repaired by the “symbolic” increasing of troops in the Western garrison.
For one of the first times as a politician, Brandt’s opinions vis-à-vis the United States
began to change. Later in his memoir, Brandt described how these events were
monumental in the way they impacted his political perceptions from that day forward:
I said later that in August 1961 a curtain was drawn aside to revel an empty stage.
To put it more bluntly, we lost certain illusions that had outlived the hopes
underlying them…[East German leader, Walter] Ulbricht95 had been allowed to
take a swipe at the Western superpower, and the United States merely winced
with annoyance. My political deliberations in the years that followed were
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substantially influenced by the day’s experience, and it was against this
background that my so-called Ostpolitik—the beginning of détente—took shape.96
Brandt knew that the West Germans were unable to unilaterally respond to the East
German building of the Berlin Wall, because the FRG had relied on the United States to
advance the diplomatic interests of West Germany. Brandt now saw that the FRG could
no longer place all of its trust in the loyalty and responsiveness of the United States to
advance its foreign policy interests, and therefore the country would have to act more
independently. It seems that the Berlin crisis was a defining moment, in which Brandt
came to the conclusion that the United States was, and would remain, more interested in
advancing it’s own self-interest and policy agenda, and would not risk putting itself in
harms way vis-à-vis the Communist bloc, in order to advance the foreign policy of the
Federal Republic.
1963 Pipeline Embargo and Grain Embargo
The next noteworthy event in the saga of Adenauer’s Ostpolitik came with the
Pipeline Embargo and the Grain Embargo in 1963. In hindsight, it seems clear that the
1963 Pipeline Embargo was harmful for West German relations with the Soviet Union.
With these trade sanctions, the Federal Republic, under the persuasion of the United
States, attempted to implement a policy of negative linkage, or a policy of negative
economic sanctions.97 An economic sanction is “any action taken by one nation or group
of nations to harm the economy of another nation or group, often to force a political
change”.98 In order to use specific linkage, the Federal Republic would have given the
Soviets a specific political action to for the FRG to undertake in order to lift these
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economic sanctions. However, in this case, the Federal Republic and the United States
articulated no clear political objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, thus using a policy of
general linkage.
Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany implemented this
embargo against the Soviet Union. The logic behind the embargo was the US belief that
pipes “over 19 inches” had “military and strategic significance”. The US told the Soviets
that it would only lift the embargo if the “Western Allies [were] able [to] feel danger to
their national security had lessened.” 99 A major reason why this embargo was considered
to be a form of general negative linkage was because there was no specific political
concession that the Allies were asking of the Soviets, but instead the vague statement
“lessened danger to national security.”100
Moreover, the United States openly claimed to the Soviets that it hadn’t
influenced any of its partners to engage in the same embargo policy toward the USSR,
and that the NATO Allies could act on their own to choose to restrict exports—“strictly
on their own responsibility in light of their judgment of their own security issues.”
However, the US was seemingly well aware of the benefits that would come if the other
western countries stood together with the US in solidarity, and cut off the export of these
pipes to the USSR. The United States and President Kennedy believed that this embargo
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would significantly impair the development of the Soviet economy, which might put the
Soviet Union at the mercy of the United States and the Western Alliance.101
Although the US denied the claim, the Soviets were not oblivious to the pressure
that was put on Chancellor Adenauer and the FRG to comply with these same sanctions
vis-à-vis the Soviets.102 In an internal memorandum a month after US Ambassador to the
USSR Kohler had a discussion with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko regarding
the embargo, top US officials admitted that the decision to pursue this policy vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union was “debatable” but that the policy line could not now be altered. The US
could not modify its position, because it had pressured other countries to also “hold the
line on the large diameter pipe”, and changing its position at that late point might have
been seen as a sign of United States weakness. The fact of the matter was that the US
had put pressure on the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Italy
to join the embargo against the Soviet Union, and changing their path could have been
understood as admitting that they had misled these other Allied Countries.103
Today, the use of negative linkage is generally ill advised when seeking to better
relations between two countries. It has been realized that this form of linkage can
decrease trust between two states, and lead to general animosity between possible trading
partners. Randall E. Newnham, a Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State
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University, who focuses on the role of economic aid and sanctions as foreign policy tools,
has extensively researched the effect that the pipeline embargo had on the relationship
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, and has commented that
the embargo was a complete failure, essentially ruining relations between the two
countries for the remainder of the decade, by hardening Soviet attitudes toward the FRG.
However, political unfriendliness was not the only consequence for the Federal Republic.
From a financial perspective, some industrialists in the Federal Republic of Germany
who had “constructed facilities to supply the USSR with pipe” were also harmed from
this embargo.104 A large export contract that businesses in Germany had previously
enjoyed was then stripped away from the economy.105 After the failure of the embargo,
the resulting damage to both sides of the Iron Curtain and subsequent ill feelings towards
Chancellor Adenauer must have been significant. However, the United States took
comfort in the fact that their “dream partner”, Chancellor Adenauer, chose to follow the
policy path that the United States had formulated for the Federal Republic.
Despite the failed attempt at the Pipeline Embargo, Adenauer decided it would be
appropriate to try yet another form of negative linkage toward the Soviet Union, but this
time with a grain embargo. In 1963, the Soviet Union had a terrible grain harvest, so it
became necessary for the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union,
Nikita Khrushchev, to make arrangements to import grain from the West.106 The USSR
was allegedly interested in purchasing three million tons of wheat from the United States
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alone.107 Adenauer attempted to bring about another set of negative sanctions against the
Soviets, this time without combined pressure from the US. This was a case of negative
specific linkage, where Adenauer made the political outcomes he sought known to the
Soviet Union: bringing down the Berlin Wall. Adenauer said “we will sell you foodstuffs
but in exchange the wall must be taken down.” However, Adenauer was unable to
achieve cooperation on the grain embargo amongst the Western Allies, so the USSR felt
little effect from the FRG’s embargo. By the time Adenauer tried to implement this
negative linkage, the Soviets had already traded with America, Canada, and Australia, to
secure over 8 million tons of wheat. 108 Moreover, the policy move that Adenauer
implemented was highly unpopular in West Germany, as he found it difficult to even find
members of his own party who supported the embargo. After Ludwig Erhard became
Chancellor in October 1963, he immediately approved export licenses for the sale of
West German wheat to the Soviets on 28 October 1963, and the embargo was dropped.109
The repercussions from these two policy failures, together, were felt through the
rest of the decade in the Federal Republic. As highlighted by these unsuccessful efforts,
it is generally agreed that negative linkage is not often a successful strategy when the
goal is to overcome diplomatic and economic barriers between two countries. The
United States was complicit in large part, for pressuring Adenauer to implement the
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pipeline embargo. As a result, the embargos paralyzed Soviet-FRG relations for at least
several years.
Increasing His Political Power: Brandt Becomes Leader of SPD and Runs for
Chancellor
By the mid 1960’s, Brandt was beginning to hold increased political power within
the Federal Republic as Mayor of Berlin, and in 1964, he became the leader of the Social
Democratic Party.110 In National Security discussions in the United States around that
same time, Mayor Brandt was named as an individual who was starting to take the
spotlight on foreign policy issues, essentially taking away political power from the
current Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gerhard Schröder.111 Mayor Brandt began to
publically hint at suggestions that the FRG take action that would not only recognize East
Germany as a legitimate entity, but also begin normalizing ties between the East and the
West. In May 1964, Brandt said: “We should propose joint projects to the peoples of
Eastern Europe and make them understand that we do not fear but that, on the contrary,
we desire a rise in their living standard to a level comparable to ours.”112 Moreover,
Brandt started to look toward Eastern trade negotiations. In September of 1964, he wrote
a paper regarding Western relations with the states of Eastern Europe, within which he
advocated engaging the Eastern European states in the “largest volume of
110
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communications possible”, saying that Western policy toward the East should reside in
economic and cultural spectra.113 These ideas were partially grounded in the notion that
the Federal Republic had grown strong enough to advance foreign policy interests on its
own behalf, but also the uncertainty that surrounded the talks of the future of American
troop presence in Europe.114
In 1965, Brandt ran against Erhard’s reelection campaign for the
Chancellorship.115 The two biggest issues between the two candidates were “the question
of passes which would permit West Berliners to visit East Berlin…and tactics in the
German struggle for reunification.” 116 Erhard won the Chancellery, but as Chancellor, he
gained the reputation for being a weak leader who had, essentially, failed on domestic
issues. Erhard’s time in office was short-lived, as the CDU/CSU-FDP Coalition he had
formed was overthrown in 1966.117
1966-1969: The Grand Coalition and Brandt as Foreign Secretary and ViceChancellor
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While Mayor of Berlin prior to taking his position as Vice Chancellor under Kurt
Kiesinger, Willy Brandt was already working to foster relationships with Soviet leaders.
Brandt had been having discussions with the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, Pyotr
Abrosimov.118 Communications between United States officials at this time show that
there was already concern over the content of the Brandt- Abrosimov conversations, and
whether Brandt would be able to pursue “interests which are shared by the Allies”, a
sentiment which became commonplace less than four years later.119 These reservations
were indicative of the larger US view toward the incoming Chancellery. Before the new
government even took office, the United States viewed the Kiesinger Chancellery in a
different light than both the Adenauer and Erhard Chancelleries. The US thought
Kiesinger would be more difficult to deal with than past West German leaders, but also
more able to handle undertakings.120 The United States viewed the outgoing Erhard
government as the last West German government of the “post-war era”, responding to
traditional postwar influences, whereas this new government would be more likely to
express German assertiveness.121
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Under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a Grand Coalition was formed in 1966
between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union party (CSU) and
the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Willy Brandt, Chairman of the SPD, became the
Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor under the Coalition, and Egon Bahr rose to the
position of Head of Planning and to Brandt’s special envoy.
1967: Report of the NATO Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel
Report)
The Harmel122 study was undertaken in 1967 by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the Harmel Report was approved in December of that year. It
reaffirmed the overall need for the Western Alliance, and became an important document
which impacted the direction of the NATO alliance. The Report “reasserted” NATO’s
purpose, and “effectively introduced” the “notions of deterrence and dialogue”.123 It
further stated that the two main tasks for the Alliance would be to maintain military
strength in order to deter aggression, and to look for solutions to underlying political
issues in order to build a more stable international relationship. Overall, it was a
broadening of the Alliance’s approach to security. This broadening was largely
influenced by the primary foreign policy issue of the day: the “US-USSR dealings and
West German activity.”124
August 1968: Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia
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The strengthening of the NATO Alliance became a serious matter of
discussion in the year after the Harmel Report was released. During the night of
20 through 21 August 1968, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact satellite states
invaded Czechoslovakia in order to stop the political spring that was sweeping
Prague. The Soviets had applied what later became the “Brezhnev Doctrine” that
night. In a speech on 11 November 1968, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev
declared that, “a threat to Socialist rule in any state of the East European bloc
constituted a threat to all and therefore “must engage the attention of all the
Socialist states.”125
Censorship had been abolished to the point that free expression had
become normality in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets had become concerned about
the future of the communist world, since they believed that the situation in
Czechoslovakia could act as a contagion, influencing citizens in Poland, Hungary,
the FRG and GDR, and even the Soviet Union, to take similar measures.126 Signs
began to emerge that Soviet action and retaliation might occur; as the Soviet press
began professing the military strength of the Soviet Union, and troop movement
toward the Czech border.127 A fundamental change was in progress in
Czechoslovakia, and if untouched by the Soviets could have affected the entire
Communist Bloc. The Soviets had much to fear in the case of Czechoslovak
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defection or easing of relations with the Warsaw Pact—including loss of
important information to the West, geographic location strategically next to
Germany, and a blow to the ideology and orthodoxy of Soviet Communism.128
However, the United States did not actually believe that the Soviet Union
would take action. A month prior, in a meeting on 24 July 1968 of President
Johnson and his Foreign Policy Advisers, the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Rostow said: “The Soviets will not move militarily against them,
I do not think. I told House we are on the Czech side.”129 When the Soviet Union
did invade, it sent a clear message to the United States and the Western Alliance
that the USSR would not simply sit back and watch one of its satellite states leave
the Communist bloc. This military action was somewhat shocking to the United
States, and in an emergency meeting of the National Security Council at 10:15pm
that night, it seemed the overriding feeling was of “confusion”.130
The events in Czechoslovakia also greatly affected the government of the
Federal Republic, including Foreign Minister Brandt. Brandt told Secretary of
State Dean Rusk in a letter on 14 September 1968, that it was the belief of West
Germany that due to these actions, the appropriate steps should be taken in order
to strengthen the Western Alliance.131 In his book, My Life in Politics, Brandt
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called this invasion, “a serious setback for our policy.”132 However, Brandt still
believed that economic relations between the East and the West should be
developed further, so long as the Soviet Union take the responsibility of restoring
conditions that Brandt thought were irreplaceable for the continuation of the
policies of détente.133

Chapter 4: Part I: Brandt Wins the Chancellery and Part II: Implementation of
Ostpolitik
Brandt, Schiller and Wehner
From the outset, Willy Brandt understood the importance of using economics to
advance his political positions. From his time as mayor and also within the Kiesinger
Chancellery as Vice Chancellor, Brandt did not garner the level of popularity that he had
hoped to have prior to his campaign for Chancellor in 1969. One of Brandt’s most
formidable opponents, the incumbent, Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, was favored by 54% of
the polled sample, while only 32% favored Brandt.134 This made it especially important
for Brandt to use the assets he could to his advantage. The campaign turned its focus
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toward the economy, and toward the individuals within the Brandt campaign that had had
strong track records bringing economic health and stability to the Federal Republic of
Germany. Willy Brandt utilized the reputation of Karl Schiller and Herbert Wehner to
his advantage.
Karl Schiller was the Minister of Economics, who had a strong track record of
bringing economic stability in times of trouble to the FRG. Under the Bretton Woods
System, Schiller had been instrumentally involved in maintaining the economic health for
the Federal Republic. Schiller was generally well liked, and Brandt was able to use this
to his benefit in all aspects of his campaign.135 Herbert Wehner left his post as Minister of
Intra-German Relations, and became the Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in the
Bundestag after Brandt was elected Chancellor. Schiller and Wehner advanced ideas that
were seen as “refreshing” to many citizens of the Federal Republic. As early as 1966,
Wehner had already been suggesting that an “economic community between West and
East Germany” be gradually established, a seemingly radical suggestion for the time
since the Federal Republic of Germany did not acknowledge the existence of the German
Democratic Republic as a separate entity in 1966.136 Schiller also saw the opportunity for
the two Germanys to trade with one another since each had a strategic position: the
Federal Republic in the West and the German Democratic Republic in the East. Looking
beyond the past and toward the future, the two influential leaders saw the wisdom of
mending ties and trade relations with the German Democratic Republic. However, these
SPD tactics did not threaten the Christian Democratic Party. In a meeting on 7 August
135
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1969, in discussions about the upcoming German elections, a confident Chancellor
Kiesinger told President Nixon and Henry Kissinger that “most Social Democrats were
resigned to losing and most Christian Democrats convinced of winning.”137
Brandt Wins the Chancellery
Controversy was rampant in the White House prior to the official election of the
next Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. On 29 September 1969, no single
German party won the absolute majority, although the Christian Democratic Party (CDU)
(former Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger’s party) came the closest with 242 seats of the 496
seats in the Bundestag, just 7 seats shy of the required majority. The Bundestag in
Western Germany was the principle legislative chamber, which possessed the majority of
the legislative power. The other chamber in the two-chambered parliament was the
Bundesrat, which had “limited” power aside from matters with the Laender, or the ten
states of the Federal Republic.138 Though the Federal Republic had both a President and
a Chancellor, the President was a symbol of authority, but had little power otherwise. The
Chancellor had most of the power within the government, since he directed the
“administrative structure” and the “legislative leadership.”139 Essentially, to be elected as
Chancellor of West Germany in 1969 was to be elected to the most powerful position in
the country.
There was some confusion about the result of the initial election results within the
White House. When President Nixon learned that Kiesinger had earned the most votes,
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he called Kiesinger to congratulate him on what Nixon thought was another term as
Chancellor. According to Julie Eisenhower Nixon, her father “placed the call” when
David [Eisenhower] told him that he heard that Willy Brandt had been defeated…David
felt terrible for giving Daddy the wrong information, especially since he [Nixon] just
picked up the phone and called—he’s impulsive that way.”140 However, this call was
made prematurely, because what the President hadn't been aware of was that although
Kurt Georg Kiesinger had won the election, he had not won an absolute majority. Since
the election produced no clear-cut winner, “a government by coalition [had to] be
arranged.” Kiesinger’s arrogance in conversations with Nixon and Kissinger earlier that
year had not manifested itself in the victory he seemed to have expected. This opened the
door for a possible change in government, potentially one that the Federal Republic of
Germany had not witnessed in three decades.
The need for this second election haunted the Nixon Administration for many
years to come, contributing to what they saw as their future difficulties and differences
with the West German governmental policy decisions. Over a year later, in June of 1971,
Kissinger said that this “no decision” for the Chancellery, and no clear-cut victory for
Kiesinger was the worst thing that could have happened to the Federal Republic. In a
conversation with President Nixon, the Assistant for National Security Affairs
complained: “The worst tragedy is that election in ’69. If this National Party, that
extreme right wing party, had got three-tenths of one percent more, the Christian
Democrats would be in office now.”141 This illustrates the sheer frustrations and
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disappointment that the Nixon administration felt toward relations with the Federal
Republic and Willy Brandt, and how the Nixon Administration was more partial to the
predictable status quo policies of the Kiesinger Chancellery.
In a memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Nixon, the President’s Assistant for
Foreign Policy wrote that the “SPD [Social Democratic Party] Chairman Brandt
expressed a strong preference for a coalition with the FDP [Free Democratic Party].”142
Since Brandt had, for many years prior to running for Chancellor, been a member of the
Grand Coalition, it may have been a surprise that he was intent on leaving it. However,
Brandt’s determination to withdraw from the Grand Coalition with the Christian
Democrats began while he was Foreign Secretary under Kiesinger. At that time, the
Hallstein Doctrine was the Federal Republic’s main policy with regard to East Germany.
The Hallstein Doctrine held that West Germany would sever relations with any country
aside from the Soviet Union that maintained diplomatic relations with the German
Democratic Republic. In a meeting with President Richard Nixon and Kissinger in
August 1969, Chancellor Kiesinger said that the Hallstein Doctrine was important to the
West Germans, because “the majority of the German people, though unhappy about the
country's continuing division, would not relinquish the right of self-determination,” and
thus, he believed that this majority also supported the policy of non-recognition of the
GDR. However, Kiesinger knew that there were many young voters and members of the
SPD (such as Brandt) who were against the doctrine.143
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Brandt’s disagreement with the doctrine did not arise because he did not believe
in self-determination, but instead Brandt saw the relinquishment of the Hallstein
Doctrine, and recognition of the German Democratic Republic, as necessary conditions
for the eventual reunification of the two German states.144 Brandt saw the necessity for
the FRG to recognize the sister state, the GDR, before relations could be mended. In a
June 1969 conversation between President Nixon and Walter Scheel, the soon to be
Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor of Germany under the Brandt Chancellery, Scheel
said that, “the Hallstein Doctrine was no longer effective, as more and more Third World
countries were granting East Germany diplomatic recognition. The FRG could not
withdraw from the Third World, and leave the DDR [Deutsche Demokratische Republik
or German Democratic Republic] there as German diplomatic representatives. No
purpose was being served by calling such recognitions ‘unfriendly acts’.”145
The frustrations that Willy Brandt felt as a part of the Grand Coalition caused him
to reconsider his role as Vice Chancellor. Brandt was said to be on the verge of resigning
from office in 1968, when Chancellor Kiesinger invoked the Hallstein Doctrine to cut off
diplomatic relations with Cambodia. However, Brandt was aware that with the
Chancellery election upcoming, resignation would be disastrous for his own chances at
election, and the prospect of bringing real change to West Germany. This sparked his
determination to pursue his own style of détente outside of the Grand Coalition.
Meanwhile, Brandt realized that he shared many viewpoints with the Federal Democratic
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Party (FDP). The FDP was calling for the normalization of relations with the GDR,
acknowledgement of the Oder-Neisse line, and renunciation of the Hallstein Doctrine, all
policies that Brandt shared a vested interest in.146 While Kiesinger saw the Nixon
administration’s Soviet Policy as “just right”, Willy Brandt sought to follow a course of a
more aggressive détente through rapprochement.
Thus, Willy Brandt formed a coalition between the SPD and FDP and was elected
as Chancellor of Germany by the Bundestag on 21 October 21, 1969. Brandt won the
election by an extremely thin margin, as he “received 251 votes, two more than the
required absolute majority of 249.”147 Brandt had become the first Social Democratic
head of government in nearly 40 years.148 Rumors circulated that the Nixon
Administration had supported the former Chancellor Kiesinger’s party, the CDU. Herein
lied a fundamental shift in the traditional relationship that US presidential administrations
experienced with regard to the Federal Republic.
The Nixon Administration was aware of their rumored favoritism for Brandt’s
opponent, and wanted to act promptly to mitigate any notion that they were unsatisfied
with the new Chancellor. The President was advised to extend a channel for private
conversation between the two leaders immediately after Brandt was elected to the
Chancellery. It was said to be critical for the President to initially establish a strong
relationship with Brandt vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In a memorandum from Secretary of
State Will Rogers to President Nixon on 17 October 1969, Rogers cautioned the President
that it was necessary for the Americans to invite Brandt to Washington before the
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Russians invited the soon-to-be Chancellor to Moscow. There was “reliable information”
that the Russians would be inviting Brandt to Moscow for a meeting. Secretary of State
Rogers believed that if the Soviets were able to invite Brandt to Moscow first, it might
appear as though the Americans were reacting to the Soviets’ invitation with an
American invitation to Washington for the new Chancellor.149
In his first address as Chancellor, Brandt, in his government declaration, on 28
October 1969, explicitly stated his goal to ease “the current tensions in the relationship
between the two parts of Germany.”150 He further stated his intentions to negotiate
“reunification-of-force agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia”
as well as hold formal talks with East Germany in order to foster “agreed cooperation”.
The most controversial line of his government declaration was when Brandt
acknowledged and named the two Germanys as separate states, when he said: “Even if
two states exist in Germany, they are not foreign countries to each other, their relations
with each other can only be of a special nature.”151 In a memorandum to Henry Kissinger,
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, pointed out a portion of the declaration in which the newly elected
Chancellor expressed the changing relationship between the Federal Republic and the
United States, in which the FRG could pursue a more “independent policy”. In the
margin of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “We will come to regret German
‘flexibility’.”152
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Shifting Interactions
Much of the disfavor that the Nixon administration felt toward the new
government in Bonn came because drastic change took place nearly immediately with
regard to its Eastern policy. Under the Christian Democratic Chancellor, Kiesinger, and
the Grand Coalition, the FRG still wished to better ties with their Eastern counterparts,
but primarily, they strove to avoid an outbreak of war. This made the CDU and CSU
components of the Grand Coalition doubtful of any plan that entailed the joining of
interests between Moscow and Bonn. The Nixon administration’s views were very much
in line with this way of thinking. It was expected, then, by the Nixon Administration,
that the hostilities of the time would remain between the Soviet Union and the Western
alliance.
Although Willy Brandt had played a dominant role in the Grand Coalition, which
for the first time in many years had an active European policy, the implementation of a
reconciliation policy with the East had been mitigated by the differences of opinion
within the coalition partners. Brandt had been developing what was seen as his radical
eastern policy for some time before becoming Chancellor, but the United States had
become accustomed to a German ally who was much more obedient and dependent. After
taking power, Bonn began working instantly to bring his “change through
rapprochement” to realization. In a telegram to the Department of State in November
1969, United States Ambassador to West Germany, Kenneth Rush wrote about the
changes in the rhetoric of the West Germans:
Brandt has cast his die. The practical result depends on the Soviet and East
German response. This had always been the case with regard to the future of East
Germany, but now the Federal Germans would be satisfied with far less than in
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the past; there is no more talk of free elections and even the word of
‘reunification’ has been dropped from the SPD-FDP vocabulary.153
The Social Democrats led by Brandt saw Moscow and East Berlin as potential partners,
and further believed that the only way to East-West reconciliation would be through
equal treatment and negotiation.
Early Interactions with Bahr and Mounting Suspicion
Although the administration generally had positive feelings with regard to the
intentions of the Chancellor himself154, there was greater internal speculation towards
other members of the Brandt Chancellery. Prior to his official inauguration, Willy Brandt
sent his emissary, Egon Bahr, to have a conversation with President Nixon’s Assistant for
Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger on 13 October 1969, in which Bahr wanted to assure
President Nixon and the administration “…in Brandt’s name, of the basic continuity in
German policy and of Brandt’s desire to have close relations.” 155 Bahr had previously
had a career in journalism before taking the post as Berlin Press Chief of the West Berlin
Senate. In 1966, he was named Ambassador for Special Tasks in the Foreign Office
when Brandt became Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequently left the Berlin Press
Chief position in 1967 to become the Chief of the Planning Staff in the West German
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Foreign Office. Under the Brandt Chancellery, Bahr gained the official title of State
Secretary in the Chancellery.156
In that initial meeting, Bahr also “outlined a series of German moves toward the
USSR, Poland and East Germany”. Kissinger was hesitant with regard to the true
intention of the new West German government as he “believed they could become
troublesome if they engender euphoria, affect Germans’ contribution to NATO and give
ammunition to our own détente-minded people here at home.” In the margin of his
memorandum to the President, Kissinger wrote: the “Germans may wind up combining
the disadvantages of every course of action. The cohesion of the FRG is not strong
enough to sustain a very great area of maneuver.”157 From the start of the relationship
between the Nixon administration and the Brandt Chancellery, Bonn made its intentions
clear: to act in a more independent manner vis-à-vis the United States than they had in the
past. The two concluded the meeting by deciding that the United States would deal with
West Germany as “a partner, not a client.”158
In the following days, Nixon sent Brandt a message, congratulating Brandt on his
victory, and suggesting that the two leaders should have direct consultation on “matters
of mutual interest”.159 Kissinger and Bahr had discussed this potential back channel in
their conversation on 13 October 1969, however, Kissinger had warned the President that
in the past Bahr had not had a reputation for discretion, so this connection would have to
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be tested.160 It became common practice for Kissinger and President Nixon to set up these
back channels of communication with other country's leaders. They found these private
networks to be useful, because it allowed Nixon and Kissinger to make decisions
independently of the State Department, who sometimes held stark differences of opinion
from Nixon and Kissinger. Moreover, for Kissinger it was beneficial, because it gave
him more direct influence in decisions that were made. In hindsight, President Nixon and
Mr. Kissinger may also have wanted to create this back channel because of the
skepticism they felt toward Brandt’s Ostpolitik, and the knowledge that the State
Department was more favorably inclined toward the new Brandt policy. Later on, this
back channel would create an interesting paradox, because it was kept secret “not only
from the public but also from the State Department and the West German Foreign
Ministry as well as the French and the British governments.”161 Meanwhile, in briefings
for President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, US State Department officials urged the
President and his advisor to consider the possible benefits of the new Ostpolitik, and not
to dismiss the Federal Republic’s strategy before they had given it enough time to come
to fruition.
The White House version of détente, at least from the viewpoint of Nixon and
Kissinger, would more or less simply ensure that the Soviet Union did not become a
threat to the world, and that the “conflict of systems would be less dangerous.”162 Their
fear was also that the growth of German nationalism could again develop into something
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more problematic, mirroring the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich. However, Brandt was
well aware of these feelings of mistrust and suspicion that other countries had toward the
FRG. In 1968, in his memoir, Brandt wrote:
German foreign policy today bears not only the burden of the second lost war
and not only the burden of the Hitler regime. It bears still another burden: the
mistrust of many people in countries abroad as to the authenticity of our desire for
reconciliation and as to whether the democrat in Germany are strong enough to
assert themselves and implement their desire for reconciliation.163
Further complicating matters, Egon Bahr was not highly trusted by the United
States. In a February 1970 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, Kissinger referred to
Bahr as “deeply mistrusted”. Kissinger believed that if “Brandt pursued the quest for
normalization, his advisors and supporters would eventually succeed in leading him to
jeopardize Germany’s entire international position.” Others felt the same way. After
returning from his trip to Europe in December 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers
debriefed the National Security Council on his trip to Europe. He referred to Bahr as “a
reptilian. I wouldn't trust him as far as I could throw him.”164
In his memoir, Kissinger noted that he “had known Bahr from Brandt’s days as
Mayor of Berlin when Bahr was press spokesman…Bahr was a man of great intelligence
and extraordinary confidence in his ability to devise formulas to overcome a diplomatic
impasse.” Kissinger believed that he was dedicated to improving relations between the
two Germanies, and
he believed that good personal relations with the Soviet and Eastern personalities
would assist this effort. His vanity caused him to flaunt these contacts and it was
no doubt occasionally exploited by his counterparts…Though Bahr was a man on
the left, I considered him above all a German nationalist who wanted to exploit
Germany’s central position to bargain with both sides. He was the type that has
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always believed that Germany could realize its national destiny only by friendship
with the East…To him, America was a weight to be added to West Germany’s
scale in the right way at the right time, but his priority was to restore relations
between the two Germanies above all.165
While many within the White House believed that Willy Brandt, himself, was a leader
with good intentions, they also believed that others within the Chancellery were not to be
trusted and that they could negatively impact the outcomes of Brandt’s policy intentions
in the long-run. After Chancellor Brandt and Bahr visited the White House for the first
time in April of 1970, in a phone conversation with Kissinger, President Nixon said that
he “couldn't believe that person Bahr!!”166
Nothing is Wrong
By definition, the Federal Republic existed largely because of the United States,
and this was the basis for the relationship between the two countries. In the midst of the
Cold War, one of the worst scenarios the United States could fathom would have been
losing West Germany’s allegiance to the Communist bloc of Eastern Europe. Fear of this
potential within the Nixon administration grew early on. Kissinger and Nixon believed
that although Brandt’s goals were admirable, the Federal Republic was in no position to
be making these arrangements unilaterally with Eastern Europe, and particularly, the
Soviets. They believed that the West Germans were naïve, and the Soviet intentions were
not on par with West German intentions. After his initial meeting with Egon Bahr on 13
October 1969, Kissinger told Nixon:
The Germans may wind up combining the disadvantages of each of their major
policies: getting sucked into more and more concession to “save” their new
Eastern policy while causing their Western allies to question their reliability. It is
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questionable whether the internal strength and cohesion of the FRG is strong
enough to sustain a series of frustrations and setbacks.167
Kissinger’s fear was that the West Germans were not in a strong enough position to be
successful in Ostpolitik without feeling the need to sacrifice their relations with the West
in order to achieve the political and economic outcomes that they sought in the Eastern
Bloc. Moreover, the United States thought that the more the West Germans were
“sucked into” negotiations and deals with the East, the more the Federal Republic would
be uprooted from the Western Alliance.
Less than two months after Brandt came to office, suspicions began swirling in
the media that the United States was not expressing their true position with regard to
Willy Brandt’s Eastern policies. It seemed that the White House found themselves’
having to defend against written stories from the reporters in the Federal Republic and
also the United States, such as the publications, Die Welt, and The New York Times.168 In
the New York Times, David Binder wrote a story telling of some “people in the White
House close to Kissinger” that had filed a formal complaint on German failure to consult
the Americans on matters of Ostpolitik. Although these frustrations were exchanged in
internal meetings, memorandums, and notes, Nixon, Kissinger and most importantly, the
United States State Department felt that it was necessary to ensure that the US maintained
a united public front with West Germany vis-à-vis the Soviets and the Communist Bloc,
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as not to appear “broken” or undecided.169 The US did not want to give the Germans the
perception that there was any sort of disagreement, alarm, or unsettled feelings with
regard to the West German policy pursuits.170 The belief within the Administration,
especially amongst State Department members, was that if there became a divided front,
then the United States would lose some of its leverage against the Soviet Union. In a
meeting with Chancellor Brandt on 6 December 1969, Secretary of State William P.
Rogers complemented the West German policy, and said that the United States
“applauded the German initiatives in Eastern Europe” further stating that it was “very
important that the US and other NATO partners show understanding for what his
[Brandt’s] government was doing.”171 Rogers either was misinformed or was not being
entirely candid when he told the Chancellor that the US “never had any doubt” about the
Federal Republic’s position in the Western Alliance. 172
Subsequently, as news leaks would report that the United States was not in favor
of the new Ostpolitik, the administration would publicly deny these reports in order to
present unity of the Western Alliance. However, it was almost evident by the lack of
stance, and lack of action, from the United States that the Nixon Administration did not
look too graciously upon Willy Brandt’s plans. Since Nixon was determined to maintain
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the diplomatic status quo, the United States was, for periods of time, very inactive,
tentative, and uncertain of how to respond to the changes that were happening in the
European political scene.
Internal Disagreement
Although Nixon and Kissinger were evidently against Ostpolitik from the outset,
those in the State Department did not have such negative views towards this “change
through rapprochement.” In a National Security Council Review Group meeting on 23
January 1970, the group reviewed a draft paper of the United States policy toward
Europe, within which, they discussed West Germany. Among the problems listed was,
“The Eastern policy (Ostpolitik) which the new Brandt government apparently intends to
pursue could introduce a potentially troublesome and disruptive element in East-West
relations and within the Alliance.” 173 During the meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand said that he was troubled by the “rigid dichotomy”
of the paper, and that by raising specific issues, the paper assumed a “static and not
dynamic situation”, in which judgments, if accepted, would “predetermine the answers”,
specifically mentioning the supposition that there was “something inherently dangerous
in the German conduct of its relations with the East.”
Other senior members of the State Department, including the German Country
Director, James Sutterlin, agreed with Hillenbrand, and felt that the paper was “loaded
with anti-German assumptions,” such as the premise that Hillenbrand proceeded to point
out: “the Federal Republic is likely to pursue its Eastern policy at the expense of the
U.S.” Kissinger recognized the shortcomings with the draft, and agreed to make the
changes necessary so that the paper would include analysis of the possible advantages of
173
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this new Eastern policy, and that it made a clear distinction between “a German policy
pursued at the expense of Western ties, and a German policy which might raise problems,
despite German intentions.” 174 However, the changes that Kissinger agreed to make in no
way demonstrated a change in the position that he, or the President felt toward this new
policy. There were substantial differences of opinion within the White House, and
Kissinger knew what he must do in order to appease all parties involved. It became
evident, here, why Kissinger and Nixon had earlier decided to create the back channel
with Brandt and Bahr. They knew that it would have been far more difficult for them to
pursue their ideal form of détente with the Federal Republic if they had to consult with
the State Department and other staff members even more frequently throughout the
process.

IMPLEMENTATION: PART II
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Osthandel
Osthandel, or Eastern Trade soon became the central tenant of the West German
Ostpolitik policy. Although the Federal Republic realized that its partnership with the
United States was important for success with its endeavors, the same way that Brandt’s
predecessors saw the importance of this relationship, the Brandt chancellery saw an
opportunity that it could exploit in regard to the implementation of Ostpolitik. Brandt
knew that the US would probably not want to sacrifice its public image and risk a crack
in the united Western front against the Communist bloc by publically reprimanding West
Germany for its more independent, aggressive moves toward the Eastern bloc. Not that
this would have been possible, anyway. The Western German economy had become too
strong for the United States to continue maintaining the same father-son relationship that
had been the norm since the conclusion of World War II. The indebtedness that the West
Germans once felt they owed the United States was still present, but Willy Brandt wanted
to act more independently. Moreover, Brandt felt reassured, because he had become
fairly confident that the United States would not withdraw its troops from Germany.175 It
is ironic, because previously as Mayor of Berlin, Brandt had rejected the idea of
Osthandel as a tool for creating communication with the Soviets.176
What made the relationship with the USSR that much easier for Brandt to develop
was the fact that the Soviets had been in favor of Brandt becoming the leader of the SPD
and subsequently supported his candidacy for Chancellor of West Germany. The Soviets
were aware of Brandt’s positions by this time, and they knew that they could reap
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diplomatic and economic gains from improved Western ties. There were specific
benefits that the Soviets expected to result from a relationship with West Germany, such
as: the ability to “infuse its ailing economy with foreign capital and technology” “gain
respect as a superpower on an equal footing with the United States and secure its empire
in Eastern Europe by furthering Western acceptance of the status quo.”177 However, aside
from the economic benefits, gaining more equal standing with the US must have been
one of the largest attractions for the USSR. An opportunity to weaken the FRG’s roots in
the Western Alliance to the detriment of the United States was invariably an appealing
possibility for the Soviets, and the Brandt Chancellery was willingly assisting them in
that direction.
Brandt initiated his Ostpolitik through talks with the Soviet Union, because he
knew that the GDR and Soviet Union were strong allies, and the Federal Republic would
need to normalize relations with the Soviet Union as the first step, before it could move
forward with political efforts in the other Communist satellite countries.178 Essentially,
then, the foundation for Brandt’s new Ostpolitik was based on Osthandel, through
negotiations seeking out trade first with the Soviet Union.179
January 1970: First Gas-Line Deal
Three months into office, Brandt successfully completed the first agreement with
the Soviets, which was both economically and politically significant, with the signing of
a gas-line deal. The Brandt government had facilitated negotiations between the Soviets
and representatives of the German steel industry. Brandt had been involved in
encouraging Ruhgrgas AG, a West German steel company to agree to the deal. “What
177
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this meant for Ruhgrgas AG was aiding a future competitor in order to help gain footing
in German natural gas industry.”180 This was a twenty-year deal signed by the Soviet
foreign trade ministry and FRG Ruhgrgas AG, in which gas would be delivered to the
Federal Republic.181
This was more or less a strategic foreign policy move masked as an economic
agreement for the West Germans. The business arrangement was used to promote better
relations between the two countries, and thus foster better long-term diplomatic as well as
economic ties. Originally, it may not have been beneficial for all German companies
involved. An assessment from the Economics Ministry in Bonn found that the gas that
the Soviets would be supplying to the West Germans would be of little commercial
interest, because the West Germans essentially had no need for this Soviet gas.182
Importantly, the Soviets were well aware that Brandt’s foreign policy objectives required
their cooperation, and thus they gained the upper hand during these negotiations. The
agreed upon trade was on pretenses very favorable for the USSR: the Soviet Union would
only have to provide “one-eleventh of the values of the trade deal as down payment and
did not have to start repaying the loan until three years after completion.” The Germans
also gave the Soviets an interest rate that was a point and a half below the market rate at 5
percent instead of 6.5 percent.183
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Nixon and Kissinger must have been both frustrated and surprised with how
quickly Brandt was able to bring about successful negotiations with the Soviet Union, on
a project that the US had previously been pursuing themselves. Nixon had wanted to
explore engaging in trade with the Soviets but by spring of 1969 had decided against it.184
The President never planned on making any concessions, instead it would be a “political
weapon” to use against the Soviets.185 This exemplified a fundamental difference in
principles between Nixon and Brandt. Where Brandt thought true amicable relations and
friendship with the Eastern Bloc might be possible, Nixon thought the Soviets could only
be dealt with as an adversary by staying a distance away. It was undoubtedly unsettling
for the President Kissinger that such a “monumental deal would be complete within three
months after negotiations had been dragging on for years.”186 Brandt had successfully
used his new approach and economic leverage to bypass the Nixon administration and
accomplish something that the United States government had been trying to negotiate
with the Soviets for some time.

March 1970: Erfurt meeting between Brandt and Stoph, Leaders of the Germanys
On 19 March, 1970, the heads of state from East and West Germany, Willi Stoph
and Willy Brandt, met in Erfurt, East Germany. The meeting itself was inconclusive, but
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the two decided they would reconvene on May 21st in Kassel, West Germany.187
However, the lack of specific results of the talks was not any sort of serious
disappointment, because this meeting was monumental in that it represented the first time
that a West German Chancellor had travelled to East Germany since the start of the Cold
War. 188 Upon arrival, Brandt received a “tumultuous” response from the East German
crowd, who cheered and shouted for the West German Chancellor. The citizens of East
Germany chanted, “Willy” and then “Willy Brandt”, in order to distinguish which leader
they were referring to.189 The following day, President Nixon was seemingly pleased to
hear of the reception for Chancellor Brandt, and he said: “K—Good. This will scare the
hell out of the Soviets. They have their problems and may come to us to help pull them
out.”190
Willi Stoph, the East German Premier, “was adamant that the Federal Republic
of Germany immediately recognize the German Democratic Republic, and allow it to
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enter into all international organizations.191 Meanwhile, Brandt “spelled out” his
definition of the special relationship he saw between the two Germanys. The three areas
of discussion that Brandt wished to revisit in their May meeting were: relations between
the two Germanys, communications, and means to alleviate obstacles to human contacts.
About their talks, Willy Brandt said: “I am proceeding from the premise that our relations
must be based on nondiscrimination and equality. Neither of us can act for the other,
neither can represent the other part of Germany abroad. This is the result of which we—
whatever the feelings—acknowledge.”192
CDU Chairman Barzel Voices Unhappiness with Brandt’s Eastern Policy
By the spring of 1970, misgivings about the Brandt policy were not unique to the
US government. In a telegram from the Embassy in Germany on 25 March 1970, the US
Ambassador to Germany, Rush, wrote about a conversation he had in regards to Brandt’s
Eastern policy with Rainer Barzel, FRG Chairman of the CDU. Barzel had told Rush that
“it was time to draw the line” on this Eastern policy, in an attempt to enlist US support to
oppose Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Barzel cited the Brandt government’s refusal to consult with
the CDU regarding this new strategy, and his fear of the long-term repercussions the
policy could have for Europe.
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would have pronounced effects on the future of Europe.”194 Although Barzel’s views
mirrored many of the same concerns United States officials had discussed regularly
within National Security Council meetings, the US government did not wish to become
directly involved in internal West German disputes regarding Eastern policy.195 As
preparations began for Brandt and Bahr’s first trip to the White House in April of 1970,
internal communications amongst American officials frequently reiterated that “general
support” should be given for the improvement of FRG relations with the East, but that no
specific approval should be made. 196
At this point, the United States was primarily concerned with keeping peace
within the Western Alliance. Strategically, there was fear that if the US were to openly
support either Brandt or his adversaries too strongly, then this could have major
repercussions in Western Europe. This manifested by the fact that although the United
States maintained these reservations with the Brandt policy, it made no direct efforts to
publically his approach, but instead continuously showed marginal support. In this case,
if the US government had chosen to side with Barzel, it might have been possible to deter
Ostpolitik, at the risk of bringing down the Brandt government. For the time being, it
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was more important for the US to maintain stability in the Western Alliance.197
Effectively, the United States was boxed into a corner of inaction.
Four Power Talks on Berlin begin on 16 March 1970198
The first session of the quadripartite talks began in Berlin on 26 March 1970. In
it’s opening remarks, the United States expressed the same sentiments that it had
previously, reiterating its welcoming of economic, social, juridical and monetary ties
between the FRG and West Berlin, but not integrating West Berlin into the FRG political
structure. The United States sought the improvement of communications between the
two sides of Berlin, procedures for assuring the movement of traffic between the FRG
and West Berlin, and an end to the restrictions on West Berlin’s travel and trade with
Eastern European countries.199
April 1970: The German-American Summit on Ostpolitik
Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr came to the White House in April of 1970 to have
the first face-to-face meeting between Brandt and Nixon since the two were elected
Chancellor and President of their respective countries. From the outset, United States'
feelings were less than amicable toward the West Germans at this time, exacerbated by
the fact that Brandt asked to vacation at Camp David for a week without an invitation
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from the US government.200 The Federal Republic’s goal in these meetings was to attain
the blessing of the United States in order to continue carrying out Brandt's Ostpolitik.
In any event, these talks were very important domestically for Brandt and Bahr,
especially with the growing tension felt from the Christian Democratic Party (CDU)
leader Barzel and his party, regarding Brandt’s policies. Moreover, this summit with the
United States would finally establish Brandt's standing as a world leader among the past
Chancellors of the FRG and amongst the ranks of the British leader Wilson, and French
leader, Pompidou.201 The outcome was also important for the Federal Republic’s strategic
negotiating position with the Soviets. Brandt sought reassurance that the American troop
presence would remain in Berlin and that the Alliance would remain strong. If the
American support of the Federal Republic were to waiver, this could send the wrong
signal to the Soviets and undermine the leverage behind Brandt's efforts at normalization.
In essence, then, the continuation of a large US troop presence and strong united Alliance
could be viewed as tacit American support of Brandt's Ostpolitik, facilitating
legitimization of negotiations with the Russians.
In the concluding remarks at the end of the summit on the morning of 11 April
1970, with President Nixon, Chancellor Brandt and numerous other FRG and US officials
present, the United States acknowledged the fact that, West Germany sought stability in
the future, and the desire to “explore how to develop new paths of progress with the
Soviet Union and East Germany.” Thus, Nixon cautiously publicly supported Brandt’s
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policy of Ostpolitik, even though both he and Kissinger were privately skeptical at best.
It seems that President Nixon thought at this point, an American intervention or
opposition to Ostpolitik would cause more damage than benefit for the Western alliance,
so the most the United States could hope for was “damage control”. Nixon reiterated the
necessity for the FRG to remain “a vital member of the Alliance” and cautioned the
Chancellor “that sure and indispensible friends must not be frightened or made suspicious
in the interest of new friends whose reliability is not certain.”202 The ideological
differences of the two leaders were plainly evident, as throughout these meetings, Nixon
continuously called for the recognition of West German grounding in the Western
Alliance, while Brandt spoke about the benefits of exploring Eastern bridges to détente.203
The Nixon administration had ultimately acquiesced and allowed Chancellor Brandt to
continue pursuit of Ostpolitik, with the FRG obtaining the public blessing from the
United States that it had been seeking. The West Germans had successfully secured the
major objectives that they had hoped for out of the summit, even though there was
persistent doubt amongst American officials behind-the-scenes.
August 1970: Brezhnev/Bahr sign Moscow Treaty
In December 1969, talks on the conclusion of a treaty between the FRG and the
Soviet Union began, leading up to one of the most significant milestones in Brandt’s
Eastern policy. On 12 August 1970, the Soviets and West Germans signed the Moscow
Treaty.204 The landmark agreement centered around a FRG-USSR renunciation of force,
in which the Germans were said to accept the current status of a divided Germany in
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return for “a more benign Soviet attitude toward West Germany”.205 By this time, the
United States government was already well aware of the growing power and influence
that the West Germans wielded in the world political arena. As West German Foreign
Minister Scheel said after initialing the treaty: “the big powers will, in the future, have to
take into consideration the maintenance of proper relations with the FRG; this applies
especially to the Western Powers.” He saw that the “FRG has a greater responsibility in
worldwide politics”.206
The signing of this agreement was not only the first major substantive foreign
policy accomplishment within Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, but it also served as a turning
point in European political relationships. Prior to this milestone, diplomatic efforts had
not led to any significant results that greatly affected East-West relations. Although the
United States viewed these FRG approaches toward the Soviet Union as “Sisyphean
efforts”, it nevertheless demonstrated that Willy Brandt was committed to executing his
Eastern policies, and that he would continue to pursue what he saw as easing the
hardships of a divided Germany, through concurrent unilateral overtures toward Poland
and Czechoslovakia.207 In its press statement after the signing of the treaty, the United
States chose its words carefully when it said: we hope that one of the next steps for “an

205The

US belief was that the West Germans were not signing a quid pro quo agreement, but instead
resigning themselves to any sort of agreement with the Soviets in the hope of better relations. HAK
thought one of the major driving factors for the Soviets in signing this treaty was access to German
technology. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security (Kissinger) to President
Nixon; 1 September 1970; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XL, Germany and
Berlin, 1969-1972, Document 113.
206 Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President
Nixon; 17 August 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XL, Germany and
Berlin, 1969-1972, Document 106.
207 In a memorandum from HAK to Nixon, HAK said that the other European nations would begin to look
at West Germany with a larger sense of “self-importance and independence—and this will be disturbing”.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security (Kissinger) to President Nixon; 1
September 1970; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin,
1969-1972, Document 113.
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improved situation in Europe” would be “tangible evidence of Soviet cooperation toward
bringing substantial practical improvements to the people of Berlin.”208
18 November 1970: Treaty of Warsaw Concluded
Nearly 10 months after negotiations began between the FRG and Poland in
February of 1970, the two countries concluded the Treaty of Warsaw in mid November
1970. The agreement called for the normalizing of relations between the Federal
Republic and Poland, and named the Oder Neisse line as the official border between
Poland and West Germany, reestablishing and reinforcing the Potsdam Agreements.209
The West Germans were again forced to compromise, because the Poles had insisted
“that the “starting point” for any normalization of relations… [was the] recognition of the
Oder-Neisse border as a final boundary, and without any qualifications.”210 This meant
Germany had lost 24.3% of its pre-war area.211 Although Brandt was proceeding down
the path he had envisioned for his Ostpolitik, the United States was less than pleased with
all the concessions it seemed the Brandt government was making in order to consummate
its Eastern deals. In a National Security Council meeting the same day as the treaty
negotiations had concluded, Kissinger asked: “What did Germans get from the Poles?”
and Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs said:
“Nothing.”212 The US officials were privately frustrated by the concessions that the
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Federal Republic seemed to be again making in this treaty, but the US, nonetheless, made
a public statement the same day claiming support and admiration for the conclusion of
negotiating this deal: “The United States is confident that this development will promote
improved relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany and help to
eliminate sources of tension in Europe.”213
7 December 1970: Brandt Kneels at Warsaw Ghetto/Warsaw Treaty Signed
A major portion of the rapprochement plan that Brandt and Bahr envisioned
consisted of “atoning” for the German sins of the past. On that night that Brandt found
out that he had achieved the slim majority necessary to win the Chancellery, Brandt said,
“Now Hitler had finally lost the war.”214 In effect, Brandt’s policy was largely based on
the desire for reconciliation and the cultivation of new ties. On 7 December 1970, in a
hugely symbolic gesture of atonement, Chancellor Willy Brandt arrived at Warsaw,
Poland and knelt at the memorial of the victims of the Warsaw ghetto. In 1943, the
Jewish inhabitants of the ghetto rose against the Nazis occupying Poland. In the uprising,
hundreds of thousands of the inhabitants were killed. That day, Brandt said, “I wanted to
apologize in the name of our people for a million crimes which were committed in the
misuse of the German name.”

215

Later that same day, Brandt officially signed the

Warsaw Treaty.
Post 1970 Trials and Tribulations
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Brandt resigned from office in 1974, but was largely successful in his endeavors
up to that point. In 1971, Brandt was recognized for his peaceful aims and awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize. Also in 1971, the Four Power Agreement was concluded, with the
successful outcome of the Soviet Union recognizing that West Berlin belonged to the
Federal Republic. In 1972, Brandt was further successful in completing Eastern
negotiations, and in 1973, the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic
Republic agreed on a “Basic Treaty” that they would establish “normal neighborly
relations”. That same year the GDR and the FRG both became official members of the
United Nations. In 1974, a spy from the German Democratic Republic in Brandt’s
immediate circle was unmasked, which subsequently prompted him to resign his position
as Chancellor.

Chapter 5: Conclusion, Success Despite a Lack of Strong United States Support
Despite a lack of genuine support from the United States, the Federal Republic of
Germany was quite successful in developing and implementing Ostpolitik, or Eastern
policy. The impetus for Brandt’s bold policies are evident: through his own experiences,
it was his belief that the United States was not primarily concerned with advancing the
foreign policy agenda for the Federal Republic of Germany, but rather was more
interested in maintaining the primary position of the United States, even if this meant

85

acting to the detriment of the Federal Republic. Moreover, West Germany’s ascendance
within the Western Alliance, politically but especially economically, had enticed the
Communist Bloc, especially the Soviets, to become more interested in unilateral EastWest negotiations, to a large degree because of the economic benefits that might come
from improved relations. Chancellor Brandt effectively leveraged his country's rising
economic power as a means to extend an alternate pathway towards détente.
As a result of Brandt's independent unilateral new approach, the United States
was put into an unfamiliar position in which they were now in the secondary role vis-àvis the Federal Republic in determining Western foreign policy initiatives in the Eastern
European political theater. The dynamics changed completely, with the US reacting to
the lead of Brandt, and having to continuously publicly support his initiatives for the
good of Western Alliance unity, even when his diplomatic aims diverged dramatically
from those of the US administration.
Economic standing and Use of Positive Linkage
The economic progress that the Federal Republic was able to achieve before
Brandt came to office, together with a struggling Russian economy, helped lay the
groundwork enabling Osthandel and the Soviet's interest in normalization talks. In a
report in February 1970, Kissinger wrote that the Soviet Union’s economic growth had
been declining for “several years”, most notably industrial growth, which was believed to
have reached its lowest point since 1946. In 1970, economic growth was projected to be
2.5%, the lowest level since 1963.216 This may have been partially due to the
“technological gap” that had developed between the Communist Bloc and their Western

216 Memorandum From Henry Kissinger to President Nixon on the economic position of the Soviet Union,
“Soviet Internal Troubles”; 2 February 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume
XII, Soviet Union, January1969- October 1970, Document 124.
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counterparts, which further intensified Soviet interest in West German negotiations. What
President Nixon saw as the “critical point”, was that Soviet leaders could not find a way
to increase economic growth by retaining such a strong handle on central political
control.217
Even though the United States had not genuinely supported the FRG in its
Ostpolitik in any substantive capacity, aside from verbal comments made publicly, Willy
Brandt was largely successful in his attempts to improve common ties with the Eastern
Bloc. This was primarily because West Germany used economic means in hopes of
incentivizing political concessions from the Soviets.218 Brandt was able to leverage West
Germany's newfound economic power in order to both encourage the Soviets to the
bargaining table and simultaneously fundamentally reverse leadership roles with the
United States vis-à-vis Eastern Bloc foreign policy. As discussed in Chapter 3, in
economic terms, linkage is the means by which two countries are related together
economically, also influencing political relations between the two countries. Willy
Brandt was able to utilize “export guarantees and other forms of state support to actively
promote trade with the East Bloc.” He was successful in using positive linkage to envelop
the USSR in a “soft net of economic ties.” 219 The Chancellery did not want to publicly
advertise these tactics, but they allowed execution of Brandt's strategy, which further
enabled him to pursue his goals of reducing East-West tension, while appeasing the
economically needy Soviet Union. If the Federal Republic of Germany had not been able
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to rebuild its postwar economy, especially in the industrial sector, none of this linkage
would have been possible.
FRG Takes Primary Role, US Takes Secondary Role
Evidently, the United States’ persistent fear of losing the ongoing peace in Europe
drove it into a diplomatic position where it had little room to maneuver. US officials
believed that if the American leadership showed too strong a leaning in either direction,
for or against Brandt’s policies, then this might cause repercussions in the Western
Alliance, and furthermore throughout all of Europe. The relationship between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the United States changed measurably when Willy
Brandt became Chancellor. Despite long-standing roles since the end of World War II,
Ostpolitik changed these dynamics. The United States was no longer the primary actor
within the relationship, but the Federal Republic became the primary actor, with
Chancellor Brandt setting the direction of the policy initiatives of East-West relations. In
essence, the United States was put into an unfamiliar position where it had to somewhat
unwillingly forgo its leadership role in order to ensure that it could keep the Federal
Republic grounded in the Western Alliance. In a letter from February 7, 1970, Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand named the “first principle” as
keeping the Federal Republic in “the Western camp”.220 The fact that this even became a
question for discussion was a significant change diplomatically. As Hillenbrand made
clear in internal communications, there was the essential fear from the US perspective
that if it were to react negatively to the West German Ostpolitik, then the West Germans
might perceive inadequacies with the Western Alliance led by the United States, and

220 Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Deputy Chief of
Mission in Germany (Fessenden), 7 February 1970; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976,
Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972, Document 53.
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explore a new home in the Eastern Bloc. Thus, the United States ultimately realized
there was no real choice; that it was in their “interest to avoid the impression that Western
interests and specifically American interests prevent the Federal Republic from exploring
possibilities of understanding with the East.”221
The United States was unwillingly put into a diplomatic corner that it had rarely
experienced before with the West Germans since the end of World War II. The US was
forced to respond to and follow the independent actions of the FRG, because the Federal
Republic had now for the first time taken the central foreign policy role in the
partnership. Essentially, the United States had no room to maneuver, to lead on its own,
but was forced to react and follow. In a National Security Council Meeting on 14
October 1970, President Nixon and the National Security Council (NSC) members
contemplated the possible paths that the United States could take. They concluded that
opposing the policy outright and bringing “Brandt down” or embracing the policy more
enthusiastically were both poor options, so instead the NSC decided that the United
States should “avoid either of the above alternatives”, because they couldn't “afford to
oppose Brandt” but they couldn't “support his policy too strongly either”.222 Therefore,
the United States was left to promote a watered down middle ground position, where it
was careful not to offend any of the primary participants.
Essentially, by the end of 1970, the United States believed that the Federal
Republic had come to accept the status quo in Central Europe by recognizing the
“existence of the GDR”, “the border adjustments (particularly the Oder Neisse Line)
221
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resulting from World War II”, and most unfortunately, the “Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe.” The United States postulated that there were two significant implications of this
outcome. The first was that in the West German's acceptance of the Soviet Union as the
hegemony in Eastern Europe, many would then believe that the FRG was representing
the beliefs of the entire Western Alliance. This again illustrates the major role that the
Federal Republic played in the Alliance at the time. Secondly, the United States feared
that other Western Governments would become more anxious to make similar unilateral
overtures towards the Eastern bloc as had the Federal Republic, which could be
disastrous for the unity and strength of the Western Alliance.223 In spite of these fears
about the fundamental changes that the West German policy moves could have on the
Western Alliance, and European relations, the United States had a greater concern that
any different strategic direction that it advocated could lead to far worse repercussions for
the maintenance of the Western Alliance, and thus chose to virtually sit on the sideline
while Brandt pursued his agenda.
What was all the more chilling for the United States and the Nixon administration
was that Brandt’s Ostpolitik had no specific, definable foreign policy objectives, no
timeline, nor any benchmarks as to when the Federal Republic would have achieved its
goals, making it much more “dangerous” in the eyes of the United States.224 With no
other viable diplomatic options, it become more and more clear that the US might have to
223
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continue in the unfamiliar secondary role of following the lead of the FRG for years into
the future. The United States believed that the Federal of Republic was showing
continued excessive generosity toward the Communist Bloc, but there was no clear
answer as to how “means relate to ends” and how their concessions in the present would,
in the future, lead to Eastern generosity. Admittedly, then, this was a period of
“diminishing US influence...increasing FRG-Soviet ties, and increasing FRG
responsibility.”225

225 Henry A. Kissinger made this statement in a National Security Council meeting on 3 1August 1970;
Minutes of the senior Review Group Meeting; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume
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